Markus Brill
Biographic Data
| ID | 4386263 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Markus Brill |
| GIVEN NAMES | Markus |
| FAMILY NAME | Brill |
| SIGNATURE | BRILL M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Technische Universität Berlin |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9509-7017 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Dynamic proportional rankings
Proportional ranking rules aggregate approval-style preferences of agents into a collective ranking such that groups of agents with similar preferences are adequately represented. Motivated by the application of live Q&A platforms, where submitted questions need to be ranked based on the interests of the audience, we study a dynamic extension of the proportional rankings setting. In our setting, the goal is to maintain the proportionality of a ra…
Proportional representation in matching markets
Given a set of agents with approval preferences over each other, we study the task of finding k matchings fairly representing everyone’s preferences. To formalize fairness, we apply the concept of proportional representation as studied in approval-based multiwinner elections. To this end, we model the problem as a multiwinner election where the set of candidates consists of matchings of the agents, and agents’ preferences over each other are lift…
Individual representation in approval-based committee voting
When selecting multiple candidates based on approval preferences of voters, the proportional representation of voters’ opinions is an important and well-studied desideratum. Existing criteria for evaluating the representativeness of outcomes focus on groups of voters and demand that sufficiently large and cohesive groups are “represented” in the sense that candidates approved by some group members are selected. Crucially, these criteria say nothi…
The excess method
Multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods
We establish a link between multiwinner elections and apportionment problems by showing how approval-based multiwinner election rules can be interpreted as methods of apportionment. We consider several multiwinner rules and observe that some, but not all, of them induce apportionment methods that are well-established in the literature and in the actual practice of representation, be it proportional or non-proportional. For instance, we show that …
Testing substitutability of weak preferences
Multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods
We establish a link between multiwinner elections and apportionment problems by showing how approval-based multiwinner election rules can be interpreted as methods of apportionment. We consider several multiwinner rules and observe that some, but not all, of them induce apportionment methods that are well-established in the literature and in the actual practice of representation, be it proportional or non-proportional. For instance, we show that …
Testing substitutability of weak preferences
Testing substitutability of weak preferences
Multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods
We establish a link between multiwinner elections and apportionment problems by showing how approval-based multiwinner election rules can be interpreted as methods of apportionment. We consider several multiwinner rules and observe that some, but not all, of them induce apportionment methods that are well-established in the literature and in the actual practice of representation, be it proportional or non-proportional. For instance, we show that …
The excess method
Dynamic proportional rankings
Proportional ranking rules aggregate approval-style preferences of agents into a collective ranking such that groups of agents with similar preferences are adequately represented. Motivated by the application of live Q&A platforms, where submitted questions need to be ranked based on the interests of the audience, we study a dynamic extension of the proportional rankings setting. In our setting, the goal is to maintain the proportionality of a ra…
Proportional representation in matching markets
Given a set of agents with approval preferences over each other, we study the task of finding k matchings fairly representing everyone’s preferences. To formalize fairness, we apply the concept of proportional representation as studied in approval-based multiwinner elections. To this end, we model the problem as a multiwinner election where the set of candidates consists of matchings of the agents, and agents’ preferences over each other are lift…
Individual representation in approval-based committee voting
When selecting multiple candidates based on approval preferences of voters, the proportional representation of voters’ opinions is an important and well-studied desideratum. Existing criteria for evaluating the representativeness of outcomes focus on groups of voters and demand that sufficiently large and cohesive groups are “represented” in the sense that candidates approved by some group members are selected. Crucially, these criteria say nothi…
Game Theory and Voting Systems (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Law (4 works) · Mathematical economics (4 works) · Statistics (4 works) · Voting (4 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Proportional representation (3 works)