Multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6298945 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Markus Brill (0000-0001-9509-7017, Technische Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany), Jean‐françois Laslier (0000-0001-8334-1350, Paris School of Economics), Piotr Skowron (0000-0002-4453-3955, University of Warsaw, Warszawa, Poland, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 358-382 |
| Publication date | 2018-07-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629818775518 |
| OpenAlex | W2558040216 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 26 |
We establish a link between multiwinner elections and apportionment problems by showing how approval-based multiwinner election rules can be interpreted as methods of apportionment. We consider several multiwinner rules and observe that some, but not all, of them induce apportionment methods that are well-established in the literature and in the actual practice of representation, be it proportional or non-proportional. For instance, we show that proportional approval voting induces the D’Hondt method and that Monroe’s rule induces the largest remainder method. Our approach also yields apportionment methods implementing degressive proportionality. Furthermore, we consider properties of apportionment methods and exhibit multiwinner rules that induce apportionment methods satisfying these properties
Apportionment · Majority rule · Mathematical economics · Operations research · Political science · Politics · Proportional representation · Proportionality (law · Remainder · Representation (politics · Voting · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Mathematics
Faces on the Ballot
The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting
Proportional Representation
Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting
Computing the optimal weights in a utilitarian model of apportionment
Why not proportional
A minimax procedure for electing committees
Multiwinner approval voting
Optimal Apportionment
Electoral Incentives for Political Corruption under Open-List Proportional Representation
Electoral Systems and Legislators’ Constituency Effort
Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation
Representative Deliberations and Representative Decisions
Fully Proportional Representation
| Citations per year | 0.57 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2019 - 2026 (8) |
| Highly cited | No |