Piotr Skowron
Biographic Data
| ID | 4386264 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Piotr Skowron |
| GIVEN NAMES | Piotr |
| FAMILY NAME | Skowron |
| SIGNATURE | SKOWRON P |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Warsaw, Warszawa, Poland |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4453-3955 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Participatory budgeting with cumulative votes
In participatory budgeting a group of decision makers is given a set of projects—each with a cost—and has to decide which projects should be funded within the constraints of an available budget. Each decision maker, in some form, expresses their preference over the projects. The goal of an aggregation procedure is to select—based on voter preferences—a subset of projects whose total cost does not exceed the budget and optimal in some sense. We pr…
Multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods
We establish a link between multiwinner elections and apportionment problems by showing how approval-based multiwinner election rules can be interpreted as methods of apportionment. We consider several multiwinner rules and observe that some, but not all, of them induce apportionment methods that are well-established in the literature and in the actual practice of representation, be it proportional or non-proportional. For instance, we show that …
Multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods
We establish a link between multiwinner elections and apportionment problems by showing how approval-based multiwinner election rules can be interpreted as methods of apportionment. We consider several multiwinner rules and observe that some, but not all, of them induce apportionment methods that are well-established in the literature and in the actual practice of representation, be it proportional or non-proportional. For instance, we show that …
Multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods
We establish a link between multiwinner elections and apportionment problems by showing how approval-based multiwinner election rules can be interpreted as methods of apportionment. We consider several multiwinner rules and observe that some, but not all, of them induce apportionment methods that are well-established in the literature and in the actual practice of representation, be it proportional or non-proportional. For instance, we show that …
Participatory budgeting with cumulative votes
In participatory budgeting a group of decision makers is given a set of projects—each with a cost—and has to decide which projects should be funded within the constraints of an available budget. Each decision maker, in some form, expresses their preference over the projects. The goal of an aggregation procedure is to select—based on voter preferences—a subset of projects whose total cost does not exceed the budget and optimal in some sense. We pr…
Game Theory and Voting Systems (2 works) · Apportionment (1 work) · Axiom (1 work) · Class (philosophy) (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Constraint Satisfaction and Optimization (1 work) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (1 work) · Law (1 work) · Law (1 work) · Local Government Finance and Decentralization (1 work)