Oskar Nupia
Biographic Data
| ID | 4386495 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Oskar Nupia |
| GIVEN NAMES | Oskar |
| FAMILY NAME | Nupia |
| SIGNATURE | NUPIA O |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidad de los Andes |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0208-6579 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Campaign finance and welfare when contributions are spent on mobilizing voters
Legislative Fragmentation and Government Spending in Presidential Democracies: Bringing Ideological Polarization into the Picture
We claim that, in presidential democracies, the effect of increasing fragmentation on government spending should be conditional on polarization, defined as the ideological distance between the government's party and other parties in Congress. We build a model where this result follows from negotiations between the legislature and an independent government seeking the approval of its initiatives—as in presidential democracies. Using cross‐country …
Distributive Politics, Number of Parties, Ideological Polarization, and Bargaining Power
We build a theoretical model that provides a previously unexplored way of addressing the spending-negotiation process between a governing party and the parties in a legislature, one that offers new insights as to how political fragmentation, ideological polarization, and bargaining power—as well as their interaction with one another—affect government spending. We show that the effects of both political fragmentation and ideological polarization o…
Legislative Fragmentation and Government Spending in Presidential Democracies: Bringing Ideological Polarization into the Picture
We claim that, in presidential democracies, the effect of increasing fragmentation on government spending should be conditional on polarization, defined as the ideological distance between the government's party and other parties in Congress. We build a model where this result follows from negotiations between the legislature and an independent government seeking the approval of its initiatives—as in presidential democracies. Using cross‐country …
Distributive Politics, Number of Parties, Ideological Polarization, and Bargaining Power
We build a theoretical model that provides a previously unexplored way of addressing the spending-negotiation process between a governing party and the parties in a legislature, one that offers new insights as to how political fragmentation, ideological polarization, and bargaining power—as well as their interaction with one another—affect government spending. We show that the effects of both political fragmentation and ideological polarization o…
Distributive Politics, Number of Parties, Ideological Polarization, and Bargaining Power
We build a theoretical model that provides a previously unexplored way of addressing the spending-negotiation process between a governing party and the parties in a legislature, one that offers new insights as to how political fragmentation, ideological polarization, and bargaining power—as well as their interaction with one another—affect government spending. We show that the effects of both political fragmentation and ideological polarization o…
Legislative Fragmentation and Government Spending in Presidential Democracies: Bringing Ideological Polarization into the Picture
We claim that, in presidential democracies, the effect of increasing fragmentation on government spending should be conditional on polarization, defined as the ideological distance between the government's party and other parties in Congress. We build a model where this result follows from negotiations between the legislature and an independent government seeking the approval of its initiatives—as in presidential democracies. Using cross‐country …
Campaign finance and welfare when contributions are spent on mobilizing voters
Economics (3 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Politics (3 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (2 works) · Fragmentation (computing (2 works) · Ideology (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Legislature (2 works)