Legislative Fragmentation and Government Spending in Presidential Democracies
Bringing Ideological Polarization into the Picture
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6300116 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Marcela Eslava (0000-0002-6828-4076, Universidad de los Andes), Oskar Nupia (0000-0002-0208-6579, Universidad de los Andes) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 387-420 |
| Publication date | 2017-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/lsq.12152 |
| OpenAlex | W2514027752 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 31 |
We claim that, in presidential democracies, the effect of increasing fragmentation on government spending should be conditional on polarization, defined as the ideological distance between the government's party and other parties in Congress. We build a model where this result follows from negotiations between the legislature and an independent government seeking the approval of its initiatives—as in presidential democracies. Using cross‐country data over time, we test the empirical validity of our claim finding that, in presidential democracies, there is indeed a positive effect of fragmentation only when polarization is sufficiently high. The same is not true for parliamentary democracies
Divided government · Economics · Fragmentation (computing · Ideology · Legislature · Negotiation · Polarization (electrochemistry · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration
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| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,38 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2022 (5) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |