Peter Slezak
Biographic Data
| ID | 440657 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Peter Slezak |
| GIVEN NAMES | Peter |
| FAMILY NAME | Slezak |
| SIGNATURE | SLEZAK P |
| AFFILIATIONS | UNSW Sydney |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9757-3283 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 16 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 38 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 15 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1981 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Who is the spectator in the Cartesian Theater
The “Cartesian Theater” is Dennett’s metaphor for the error of positing a homunculus or “little man” who watches an inner screen on which our thoughts appear – “the most tenacious bad idea bedevilling our attempts to think about consciousness.” However, I suggest Dennett’s analysis must be modified to avoid two significant mistakes. First, I show that, contrary to much academic teaching and scholarship, Descartes was not guilty of the homunculus …
Thinking about thinking: Language, Thought and Introspection
The social psychology of science; The trouble with science
A Second Look at David Bloor's: Knowledge and Social Imagery
The recent republication of David Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery in a second edition provides an occasion to reappraise the celebrated work which launched the so-called Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge. This work embodies the general outlook and foundational principles in a way that is still characteristic of its descendents. Above all, the recent republication of Bloor's original book is evidence of the continuing …
Sociology of scientific knowledge and science education part 2: Laboratory life under the microscope
Artificial Experts
How Strong is the `Strong Programme
1. Steve Woolgar, 'A Coffeehouse Conversation on the Possibility of Mechanizing Discovery and its Sociological Analysis', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 19, No. 4 (November 1989), 658-69. 2. Michael E. Gorman, 'Beyond Strong Programmes: How Cognitive Approaches Can Complement SSK', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 19, No. 4 (November 1989), 643-53. 3. For a preliminary account, see the forthcoming volume of the Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy…
Computers, Contents and Causes: Replies to My Respondents
Scientific Discovery by Computer as Empirical Refutation of the Strong Programme
In his manifesto for the `strong programme' in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), David Bloor expressed its diametric opposition to the `mentalist' or `teleological' model of `rationalist' philosophers, saying that `there can be no doubt that if the teleological model is true then the strong programme is false'. The `teleological' point of view can be seen embodied in the mentalism of contemporary interdisciplinary research under the he…
Computers, Brains and Minds: Essays in Cognitive Science
Was Descartes a Liar? Diagonal Doubt Defended
Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory.
Three decades ago, philosophers began to devote considerable attention to a group of problems concerning human action. In the first stage they concentrated on providing an action theory that could be used to resolve some traditional philosophical problems, such as the free-will issue, the mind-body problem, and the conditions for attribution of responsibility. About that time it became clear that philosophical action theory could not, by itself, …
Actions, cognition and the self
Descartes's Diagonal Deduction
Gödel's Theorem and the Mind
Language and psychological reality: Discussion of Rudolf Botha's study
Scientific Discovery by Computer as Empirical Refutation of the Strong Programme
In his manifesto for the `strong programme' in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), David Bloor expressed its diametric opposition to the `mentalist' or `teleological' model of `rationalist' philosophers, saying that `there can be no doubt that if the teleological model is true then the strong programme is false'. The `teleological' point of view can be seen embodied in the mentalism of contemporary interdisciplinary research under the he…
Sociology of scientific knowledge and science education part 2: Laboratory life under the microscope
Descartes's Diagonal Deduction
Gödel's Theorem and the Mind
Thinking about thinking: Language, Thought and Introspection
A Second Look at David Bloor's: Knowledge and Social Imagery
The recent republication of David Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery in a second edition provides an occasion to reappraise the celebrated work which launched the so-called Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge. This work embodies the general outlook and foundational principles in a way that is still characteristic of its descendents. Above all, the recent republication of Bloor's original book is evidence of the continuing …
How Strong is the `Strong Programme
1. Steve Woolgar, 'A Coffeehouse Conversation on the Possibility of Mechanizing Discovery and its Sociological Analysis', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 19, No. 4 (November 1989), 658-69. 2. Michael E. Gorman, 'Beyond Strong Programmes: How Cognitive Approaches Can Complement SSK', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 19, No. 4 (November 1989), 643-53. 3. For a preliminary account, see the forthcoming volume of the Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy…
Computers, Contents and Causes: Replies to My Respondents
Computers, Brains and Minds: Essays in Cognitive Science
Language and psychological reality: Discussion of Rudolf Botha's study
Gödel's Theorem and the Mind
Descartes's Diagonal Deduction
Actions, cognition and the self
Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory.
Three decades ago, philosophers began to devote considerable attention to a group of problems concerning human action. In the first stage they concentrated on providing an action theory that could be used to resolve some traditional philosophical problems, such as the free-will issue, the mind-body problem, and the conditions for attribution of responsibility. About that time it became clear that philosophical action theory could not, by itself, …
Was Descartes a Liar? Diagonal Doubt Defended
Computers, Contents and Causes: Replies to My Respondents
Scientific Discovery by Computer as Empirical Refutation of the Strong Programme
In his manifesto for the `strong programme' in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), David Bloor expressed its diametric opposition to the `mentalist' or `teleological' model of `rationalist' philosophers, saying that `there can be no doubt that if the teleological model is true then the strong programme is false'. The `teleological' point of view can be seen embodied in the mentalism of contemporary interdisciplinary research under the he…
Computers, Brains and Minds: Essays in Cognitive Science
How Strong is the `Strong Programme
1. Steve Woolgar, 'A Coffeehouse Conversation on the Possibility of Mechanizing Discovery and its Sociological Analysis', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 19, No. 4 (November 1989), 658-69. 2. Michael E. Gorman, 'Beyond Strong Programmes: How Cognitive Approaches Can Complement SSK', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 19, No. 4 (November 1989), 643-53. 3. For a preliminary account, see the forthcoming volume of the Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy…
Artificial Experts
A Second Look at David Bloor's: Knowledge and Social Imagery
The recent republication of David Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery in a second edition provides an occasion to reappraise the celebrated work which launched the so-called Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge. This work embodies the general outlook and foundational principles in a way that is still characteristic of its descendents. Above all, the recent republication of Bloor's original book is evidence of the continuing …
Sociology of scientific knowledge and science education part 2: Laboratory life under the microscope
The social psychology of science; The trouble with science
Thinking about thinking: Language, Thought and Introspection
Who is the spectator in the Cartesian Theater
The “Cartesian Theater” is Dennett’s metaphor for the error of positing a homunculus or “little man” who watches an inner screen on which our thoughts appear – “the most tenacious bad idea bedevilling our attempts to think about consciousness.” However, I suggest Dennett’s analysis must be modified to avoid two significant mistakes. First, I show that, contrary to much academic teaching and scholarship, Descartes was not guilty of the homunculus …
Epistemology (14 works) · Philosophy (14 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Sociology (8 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (6 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Philosophy of science (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works)