Who is the spectator in the Cartesian Theater
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21591789 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Peter Slezak (0000-0001-9757-3283, UNSW Sydney, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 39 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 894-909 |
| Publication date | 2026-04-03 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09515089.2025.2573764 |
| OpenAlex | W4415126996 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 27 |
The “Cartesian Theater” is Dennett’s metaphor for the error of positing a homunculus or “little man” who watches an inner screen on which our thoughts appear – “the most tenacious bad idea bedevilling our attempts to think about consciousness.” However, I suggest Dennett’s analysis must be modified to avoid two significant mistakes. First, I show that, contrary to much academic teaching and scholarship, Descartes was not guilty of the homunculus or Cartesian Theater fallacy, as he explains in his physiological writings La Dioptrique and Traité de L’homme neglected by philosophers. Second, I argue that the Theater metaphor must be understood quite differently from the way it has been conceived by Dennett. Indeed, following Descartes, I suggest that the pseudo-explanation arises not from what is included in our theory to do the “clever work” but rather from what is missing. The temptation is not “to imagine an inner agent” but rather it is the failure to notice that a model can’t work without “an intelligent and comprehending reader” – the theorist. Finally, I argue that, once the error is properly understood in this way, we can see that it is implicated in several controversial theories in philosophy
Cartesian coordinate system · Lying · Metaphor · Notice · Temptation · Classical Antiquity Studies · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Concepts
Things and Places
Image And Brain
The Case for Mental Imagery
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?
Minds, brains, and programs
Mind, Language and Reality
Descartes' Natural Philosophy
Psychosemantics
Realistic Monism
Reason, Truth and History
Reflections on Naming and Necessity
Speaking of Nothing
Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science
A hundred years of consciousness
Intentionality
The Inescapability of Gettier Problems
Is Consciousness a Brain Process
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |