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Who is the spectator in the Cartesian Theater

Bibliographic Data

ID21591789
AuthorsPeter Slezak (0000-0001-9757-3283, UNSW Sydney, corresponding author)
Year2026
Volume39
Issue3
Pages894-909
Publication date2026-04-03
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09515089.2025.2573764
OpenAlexW4415126996
LanguageEN
References cited27

The “Cartesian Theater” is Dennett’s metaphor for the error of positing a homunculus or “little man” who watches an inner screen on which our thoughts appear – “the most tenacious bad idea bedevilling our attempts to think about consciousness.” However, I suggest Dennett’s analysis must be modified to avoid two significant mistakes. First, I show that, contrary to much academic teaching and scholarship, Descartes was not guilty of the homunculus or Cartesian Theater fallacy, as he explains in his physiological writings La Dioptrique and Traité de L’homme neglected by philosophers. Second, I argue that the Theater metaphor must be understood quite differently from the way it has been conceived by Dennett. Indeed, following Descartes, I suggest that the pseudo-explanation arises not from what is included in our theory to do the “clever work” but rather from what is missing. The temptation is not “to imagine an inner agent” but rather it is the failure to notice that a model can’t work without “an intelligent and comprehending reader” – the theorist. Finally, I argue that, once the error is properly understood in this way, we can see that it is implicated in several controversial theories in philosophy

Cartesian coordinate system · Lying · Metaphor · Notice · Temptation · Classical Antiquity Studies · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo

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