Realistic Monism

Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism

Bibliographic Data

ID23152166
AuthorsGalen Strawson (0000-0003-0899-5906, corresponding author)
Year2008
Pages53-74
Publication date2008-05-29
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueReal materialism and other essays (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0003
OpenAlexW1487704329
ISBN9780199267422
LanguageEN
Citations received78

This chapter discusses the following statements: a materialist holds that every concrete phenomenon is wholly physical or material and a realistic materialist is a full-fledged realist about consciousness. Therefore it follows that a realistic materialist must hold that consciousness is a wholly physical phenomenon, and that at least some arrangements of matter are conscious or constitute consciousness. The chapter asks: what follows from this? It must be assumed in a standard way that all matter is made of the same stuff (leptons and quarks, or strings, or...) and it must follow that all matter can be arranged in a consciousness-constituting way. It is then argues that for certain things A, you cannot get A from non-A, and that consciousness is one of those things. Therefore no matter can be wholly non-conscious in its 'intrinsic' or 'ultimate' nature. If so, any realistic — any truly serious — materialist must be a panpsychist.

Consciousness · Epistemology · Materialism · Metaphysics · Monism · Phenomenon · Physicalism · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy

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