Russellian Physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21370586 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Marcelino Botin (0000-0002-8728-969X, Universitat de Barcelona, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 180 |
| Issue | 7 |
| Pages | 1829-1848 |
| Publication date | 2023-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11098-023-01955-1 |
| OpenAlex | W4366429319 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 30 |
Russellian physicalism is becoming increasingly popular because it promises to deliver what everybody wants, realism and physicalism about consciousness. But Russellian physicalists are not the first to swear on “the promise”, standard Type-B physicalism is a less fanciful view that also claims to give everything and take nothing. In this paper, I argue that our hopes should not be placed on Russellian physicalism because, unlike Type-B physicalism, it cannot explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal the nature of phenomenal properties without weakening its physicalist credentials. The revelation challenge shows that Russellian physicalism is either committed to an anti-realist and self-defeating view of phenomenal concepts or it is physically unacceptable
Consciousness · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Nothing · Philosophy of mind · Physicalism · Property (philosophy) · Realism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Quantum Mechanics and Applications
Ignorance and Imagination
Mind in a Physical World
Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism
Thinking about Consciousness
Consciousness
Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness
Realistic Monism
The Reality of Consciousness
Consciousness and Categorical Properties
Russellian physicalism and its dilemma
Revelation and physicalism
Revelation and the intuition of dualism
In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy 1
Two Conceptions of the Physical
The Russellian Monist's Problems with Mental Causation
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |