Mind in a Physical World
An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23399280 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jaegwon Kim (0009-0003-2526-1135, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1998 |
| Pages | 156 |
| Publication date | 1998-10-27 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Mind in a Physical World (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | The MIT Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.7551/mitpress/4629.001.0001 |
| OpenAlex | W4244212082 |
| Open Library | OL29709485M |
| ISBN | 9780262277105 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 271 |
This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind—in particular, the mind-body problem, mental causation, and reductionism. This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind—in particular, the mind-body problem, mental causation, and reductionism. Kim construes the mind-body problem as that of finding a place for the mind in a world that is fundamentally physical. Among other points, he redefines the roles of supervenience and emergence in the discussion of the mind-body problem. Arguing that various contemporary accounts of mental causation are inadequate, he offers his own partially reductionist solution on the basis of a novel model of reduction. Retaining the informal tone of the lecture format, the book is clear yet sophisticated. Bradford Books imprint
Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · History · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Psychology · Causalité · Causaliteit · Causation · Esprit et corps · Geist · Kausalität · Leib-Seele-Problem · Lichaam en geest · Mind & Body · Mind and body · Philosophie de l'esprit · Philosophy · Philosophy & Religion · Philosophy of mind · Reductionisme · Reduktionismus · Speculative Philosophy
Phenomenological Laws and Mechanistic Explanations
Arguing About Moral Causation
Mental Causation
Physicalism Deconstructed
Substance
Scientific representation
Life and Mind
Against Grounding Necessitarianism
Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem
Emergence, Reduction and Supervenience
Some Consequences (and Enablings) of Process Metaphysics
Does Functional Reduction Need Bridge Laws? A Response to Marras
Moral Explanation and the Special Sciences
Reasons for Actions and Desires
Moral Facts as Configuring Causes
Emergentism and Sadra’s psychology; a common physicalistic challenge
Mind-Brain Dualism in Psychiatry
Cognitive Neuroscience and Causal Inference
How Can a Machine That Is Conscious and Chooses Freely Be Built
Consciousness, Causation, and Confusion
Physicalism, Closure, and the Structure of Causal Arguments for Physicalism
How to Think about the Debate over the Reality of Beliefs
Understanding as explaining
A Causal Exclusion Problem for Knowledge-First Epistemology
The hard problem of consciousness as a crisis of rationalist metaphysics according to Lev Shestov
Appearance and Persistence as the Unity of Diachronic and Synchronic Concepts of Emergence
An Emergentist Approach to Phenomenal Causality
Experiments on causal exclusion
Seemings and Moore’s Paradox
The Timing Problem for Dualist Accounts of Mental Causation
Are Phenomenal Properties Determinables of Physical Determinates? A Response to Wilson
Spectral Reflectances and Commensurateness
Does Panpsychism Explain Mental Causation
Powers, Processes, and Time
The Revised Reward Theory of Desire
Inter-level Causal Compatibility Without Identity
Mind Talk
Physicalism or Anti-physicalism
One-Term Physicalism
Two Physicalist Arguments for Microphysical Manyism
Emergent Causal Laws and Physical Laws
Exclusion, subset realization, and part‐whole relations
From Computational Indeterminacy to the Causal Relevance of Mental Content
The causal efficacy of composites
Moral principle explanations of supervenience
Mereological emergentism and agent-causal libertarianism
Agential capacities
Physicalism without supervenience
The Ikea effect and the production of epistemic goods
Russellian Physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong
What is priority monism
Phenomenal knowledge and phenomenal causality
Grounding and properties
Do group agents have free will
A nonreductive physicalist libertarian free will
Expressivism, inferentialism, and the status of attitudes
The disappearing agent as an exclusion problem
The Contribution of Systemic Thought to Critical Realism
A Functional Account of Causation; or, A Defense of the Legitimacy of Causal Thinking by Reference to the Only Standard That Matters—Usefulness (as Opposed to Metaphysics or Agreement with Intuitive Judgment)
Christian List, Why Free Will Is Real
Santayana’s Epiphenomenalism Reconsidered
Introductory article
Toward Emergent Holism
Realization in biology
Model-based cognitive neuroscience
The Explanatory Autonomy of Psychology
The status of functional explanation in psychology
Functions, levels, and mechanisms
Causal and Functional Explanations
Genetic Determinism
Reductionism Revisited
The missing G
More Worry and Less Love
Intelligent Design Psychology and Evolutionary Psychology on Consciousness
Intelligent Design Psychology and Evolutionary Psychology
Competing conceptions of God
If naturalism is true, then scientific explanation is impossible
Emergenz und Reduktion
Dynamics Is Not Enough
Naturalism Fails an Empirical Test
On the Constitutive Property Reply
Explanatory Exclusion and the Intensionality of Explanation
Flat Physicalism
Multiple Realizations, Diverse Implementations and Antireductionism
Realism and Lexical Flexibility
A philosophical analysis of the emergence of language
Why We Should Lower Our Expectations about the Explanatory Gap
On the Formal Compatibility Between Ontic Emergence and Physicalism
Taking Referentialism Seriously
Social Entities and the Basis of Their Powers
Naturalism and the Scientific Status of the Social Sciences
Max Weber und die Emergenz. Ein Programm eines nicht-reduktionistischen Individualismus
Selfish Sounds and Linguistic Evolution
How To Be Responsible For Something Without Causing It
Don’t Panic
Grounding physicalism and the knowledge argument
What Is Methodological Individualism? Anatomy of a Controversy
Semantic Normativity and Semantic Causality
Non‐Reductive Physicalism Cannot Appeal to Token Identity 1
Mind in a Physical World
| Unique citing works | 271 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 10,04 |
| Citation span | 1999 - 2026 (28) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 270 |