Taking Referentialism Seriously
A Response to the Modal Argument
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20141998 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Brendan O'Sullivan, Brendan O’Sullivan (0000-0002-9025-6813, Stonehill College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 76 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 54-67 |
| Publication date | 2010-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2009.01058.x |
| OpenAlex | W2120660711 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 14 |
I argue that an identity theorist can successfully resist a Kripkean modal argument by employing what I call a metaconceptual move. Furthermore, by showing how this move fails to apply straightforwardly to Chalmers' argument, I clarify the nature of the threat presented by Chalmers and how it differs from a Kripkean modal argument
Aesthetics · Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Identity (music) · Modal · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Mind in a Physical World
Thinking about Consciousness
Purple Haze
Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness
Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?
There are Fewer Things in Reality Than are Dreamt of in Chalmers's Philosophy
Two Conceptions of the Physical
Conceiving of Pain
An Argument for the Identity Theory
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |