The Russellian Monist's Problems with Mental Causation

Bibliographic Data

ID4351645
AuthorsRobert Howell, Robert J Howell (0000-0002-8766-5544, Southern Methodist University, corresponding author)
Year2015
Volume65
Issue258
Pages22-39
Publication date2015-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqu058
OpenAlexW2024103495
LanguageEN
Citations received9
References cited29

Russellian Monism, the view that phenomenal or protophenomenal properties serve as the categorical grounds of physical dispositions, has increasingly been thought to enjoy an advantage over traditional property dualism in that it avoids epiphenomenalism. This paper argues otherwise. Russellian Monism faces problems with mental causation that parallel those of traditional dualism. The best it can hope for is that phenomenal properties are causally relevant, but not in virtue of their phenomenality.

Causation · Epistemology · Monism · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology

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