A posteriori Russellian physicalism

A new solution to the meta-problem of consciousness

Bibliographic Data

ID10691186
AuthorsMarcelino Botin (0000-0002-8728-969X, Universitat de Barcelona, corresponding author)
Year2024
Publication date2024-10-22
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqae127
OpenAlexW4403703272
LanguageEN
References cited24

The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we believe that there is a hard problem of consciousness. A solution to the former promises to take us one step closer to solving the latter. While many hope for a physicalist realist solution to the meta-problem, I argue that the two prominent physicalist realist positions in the literature, orthodox Russellian and type-B physicalism, cannot deliver a solution. I then introduce a posteriori Russellian physicalism, a Russellian version of the phenomenal concept strategy, and show that it can overcome the difficulties of traditional Russellian and type-B physicalism. If successful, the paper shows that physicalists need not turn to illusionism because the prospects for a physicalist realist answer to the meta-problem are bright

A priori and a posteriori · Consciousness · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Physicalism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Quantum Mechanics and Applications

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