Henrik Friberg‐fernro
Biographic Data
| ID | 4421525 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Henrik Friberg‐fernro |
| GIVEN NAMES | Henrik |
| FAMILY NAME | Friberg‐fernro |
| SIGNATURE | FERNRO H F |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Gothenburg |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3645-8625 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 9 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 11 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Can People be Made More Rational? Testing Whether People’s Ability to Assess Arguments can be Enhanced
Scholars have expressed widespread concern about voters’ ability to critically evaluate political messages, particularly in light of recent democratic outcomes such as the election of Donald Trump and the Brexit referendum. This study investigates whether written instructions alone—without interpersonal interaction—can enhance individuals’ ability to assess the strength of arguments. Drawing on the argument scheme approach and its associated crit…
Implications of Rejecting Common‐Sense Realism for the Practice and Aim of Knowledge‐Based Education
In this article, I assume that it is universally accepted that education—at least sometimes—should aim at knowledge. Moreover, I take my point of departure from the classical (and minimal) definition of knowledge in terms of justified true belief (JTB). I further assume that this definition usually rests on a common‐sense realist notion of truth, which I take to minimally entail that whether something is true or not is independent of our beliefs …
An epistemic alternative to the public justification requirement
How should the state justify its coercive rules? Public reason liberalism endorses a public justification requirement: Justifications offered for authoritative regulations must be acceptable to all members of the relevant public. However, as a criterion of legitimacy, the public justification requirement is epistemically unreliable: It prioritizes neither the exclusion of false beliefs nor the inclusion of true beliefs in justifications of politi…
Leaving Naturalism Behind
The aim of this paper is to encourage liberals to reconsider whether liberalism needs to be compatible with naturalism—as is demanded by public reason liberalism—by showing the comparative cost of that and the advantages of grounding liberalism in theism, which is the main alternative to naturalism. The reason why theism provides better grounds for defending liberalism than naturalism does, is that justifying human freedom and equality—which are …
The Explanatory Power of the Soul
Liberalism and naturalism are the reigning orthodoxies of most faculties today, while dualism is overwhelmingly rejected. The overarching claim defended in this paper is that liberals should consider dualism more seriously than what currently seems to be the case. This claim will be defended in two stages. First, I will argue that dualism provides better resources with which to defend foundational liberal commitments to human equality and human a…
Deliberation after Consensus
This editorial introduction presents an overview of the themes explored in the symposium on Deliberation after Consensus. For all the talk of its obsolescence and irrelevance, the concept of consensus still remains centrally contested through generations of deliberative democracy scholarship. In face of criticism for being neither empirically feasible nor normatively desirable, some deliberative theorists have moved away from consensus-oriented t…
Media and the power of naming
Racism has been widely discredited in past decades, and opinions that are perceived to be in conflict with the anti-racist norm are considered improper. Therefore, the anti-racist norm arguably represents an obstacle for anti-immigration parties. They must ensure that their criticism is not perceived as racism since that threatens to delegitimize the party and thereby undermine its possibilities for electoral success. The idea of the study is tha…
Respect, Coercion, and Religious Reasons
It is often assumed that people of faith should not endorse a law for religious reasons, since such an endorsement is considered to be disrespectful. Such a position is increasingly opposed by scholars who argue that such demands unjustifiably force people of faith to compromise their religious ideals. In order to defend their opposition to such demands, some scholars have invoked thought experiments as reductio arguments against the claim that e…
The limits of the principle of charity
The Consensus Paradox
This article explores a tension in deliberative democratic theory. The tension consists in that deliberative opinion formation ideally aims to reach consensus, while a consensus, once established, will likely impede the conditions for further rational public discourse. Hence, over time, deliberative democracy might risk undermining itself. While the tension is demonstrable in theory, we also suggest three cognitive and socio-psychological mechani…
The responsibility to protect – An incoherent doctrine
The responsibility to protect – An incoherent doctrine
The Consensus Paradox
This article explores a tension in deliberative democratic theory. The tension consists in that deliberative opinion formation ideally aims to reach consensus, while a consensus, once established, will likely impede the conditions for further rational public discourse. Hence, over time, deliberative democracy might risk undermining itself. While the tension is demonstrable in theory, we also suggest three cognitive and socio-psychological mechani…
Media and the power of naming
Racism has been widely discredited in past decades, and opinions that are perceived to be in conflict with the anti-racist norm are considered improper. Therefore, the anti-racist norm arguably represents an obstacle for anti-immigration parties. They must ensure that their criticism is not perceived as racism since that threatens to delegitimize the party and thereby undermine its possibilities for electoral success. The idea of the study is tha…
The responsibility to protect – An incoherent doctrine
The Consensus Paradox
This article explores a tension in deliberative democratic theory. The tension consists in that deliberative opinion formation ideally aims to reach consensus, while a consensus, once established, will likely impede the conditions for further rational public discourse. Hence, over time, deliberative democracy might risk undermining itself. While the tension is demonstrable in theory, we also suggest three cognitive and socio-psychological mechani…
Respect, Coercion, and Religious Reasons
It is often assumed that people of faith should not endorse a law for religious reasons, since such an endorsement is considered to be disrespectful. Such a position is increasingly opposed by scholars who argue that such demands unjustifiably force people of faith to compromise their religious ideals. In order to defend their opposition to such demands, some scholars have invoked thought experiments as reductio arguments against the claim that e…
The limits of the principle of charity
Media and the power of naming
Racism has been widely discredited in past decades, and opinions that are perceived to be in conflict with the anti-racist norm are considered improper. Therefore, the anti-racist norm arguably represents an obstacle for anti-immigration parties. They must ensure that their criticism is not perceived as racism since that threatens to delegitimize the party and thereby undermine its possibilities for electoral success. The idea of the study is tha…
Deliberation after Consensus
This editorial introduction presents an overview of the themes explored in the symposium on Deliberation after Consensus. For all the talk of its obsolescence and irrelevance, the concept of consensus still remains centrally contested through generations of deliberative democracy scholarship. In face of criticism for being neither empirically feasible nor normatively desirable, some deliberative theorists have moved away from consensus-oriented t…
The Explanatory Power of the Soul
Liberalism and naturalism are the reigning orthodoxies of most faculties today, while dualism is overwhelmingly rejected. The overarching claim defended in this paper is that liberals should consider dualism more seriously than what currently seems to be the case. This claim will be defended in two stages. First, I will argue that dualism provides better resources with which to defend foundational liberal commitments to human equality and human a…
Leaving Naturalism Behind
The aim of this paper is to encourage liberals to reconsider whether liberalism needs to be compatible with naturalism—as is demanded by public reason liberalism—by showing the comparative cost of that and the advantages of grounding liberalism in theism, which is the main alternative to naturalism. The reason why theism provides better grounds for defending liberalism than naturalism does, is that justifying human freedom and equality—which are …
An epistemic alternative to the public justification requirement
How should the state justify its coercive rules? Public reason liberalism endorses a public justification requirement: Justifications offered for authoritative regulations must be acceptable to all members of the relevant public. However, as a criterion of legitimacy, the public justification requirement is epistemically unreliable: It prioritizes neither the exclusion of false beliefs nor the inclusion of true beliefs in justifications of politi…
Can People be Made More Rational? Testing Whether People’s Ability to Assess Arguments can be Enhanced
Scholars have expressed widespread concern about voters’ ability to critically evaluate political messages, particularly in light of recent democratic outcomes such as the election of Donald Trump and the Brexit referendum. This study investigates whether written instructions alone—without interpersonal interaction—can enhance individuals’ ability to assess the strength of arguments. Drawing on the argument scheme approach and its associated crit…
Implications of Rejecting Common‐Sense Realism for the Practice and Aim of Knowledge‐Based Education
In this article, I assume that it is universally accepted that education—at least sometimes—should aim at knowledge. Moreover, I take my point of departure from the classical (and minimal) definition of knowledge in terms of justified true belief (JTB). I further assume that this definition usually rests on a common‐sense realist notion of truth, which I take to minimally entail that whether something is true or not is independent of our beliefs …
Law (9 works) · Political science (9 works) · Politics (8 works) · Sociology (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Law and economics (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (5 works) · Democracy (4 works)