David A Fisk
Biographic Data
| ID | 4446861 |
|---|---|
| NAME | David A Fisk |
| GIVEN NAMES | David A |
| FAMILY NAME | Fisk |
| SIGNATURE | FISK D A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California San Diego |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1978 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Superfluous or Mischievous
Governments often extol the policy refining functions of second chambers, but in bicameral parliamentary systems, governments must balance these policy refinement functions with their ability to pass legislation in the second chamber. I examine government defeats in the second chamber, suggesting they are a function of the cost and the likelihood of defeat. Using an original dataset, I find that strong veto authority creates incentives for govern…
Extreme or Neutralist
Journal Article Extreme or Neutralist Get access David A. Fisk David A. Fisk Long Beach, California Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic PubMed Google Scholar Social Work, Volume 23, Issue 4, July 1978, Page 348, https://doi.org/10.1093/sw/23.4.348-a Published: 01 July 1978
Superfluous or Mischievous
Governments often extol the policy refining functions of second chambers, but in bicameral parliamentary systems, governments must balance these policy refinement functions with their ability to pass legislation in the second chamber. I examine government defeats in the second chamber, suggesting they are a function of the cost and the likelihood of defeat. Using an original dataset, I find that strong veto authority creates incentives for govern…
Extreme or Neutralist
Journal Article Extreme or Neutralist Get access David A. Fisk David A. Fisk Long Beach, California Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic PubMed Google Scholar Social Work, Volume 23, Issue 4, July 1978, Page 348, https://doi.org/10.1093/sw/23.4.348-a Published: 01 July 1978
Superfluous or Mischievous
Governments often extol the policy refining functions of second chambers, but in bicameral parliamentary systems, governments must balance these policy refinement functions with their ability to pass legislation in the second chamber. I examine government defeats in the second chamber, suggesting they are a function of the cost and the likelihood of defeat. Using an original dataset, I find that strong veto authority creates incentives for govern…
Balance (ability (1 work) · Economics (1 work) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (1 work) · Finance (1 work) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (1 work) · Function (biology (1 work) · Government (linguistics (1 work) · History (1 work) · History (1 work) · Incentive (1 work)