Superfluous or Mischievous
Evaluating the Determinants of Government Defeats in Second Chambers
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6300228 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David Fisk (0000-0003-3335-5695), David A Fisk (University of California San Diego, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 36 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 231-253 |
| Publication date | 2011-05-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00012.x |
| OpenAlex | W2164132583 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 24 |
Governments often extol the policy refining functions of second chambers, but in bicameral parliamentary systems, governments must balance these policy refinement functions with their ability to pass legislation in the second chamber. I examine government defeats in the second chamber, suggesting they are a function of the cost and the likelihood of defeat. Using an original dataset, I find that strong veto authority creates incentives for governments to act strategically to avoid defeats (even when facing a friendly chamber), while opposition majorities and a weaker ability to sanction members who deviate from their party's position increase the likelihood of defeat
Balance (ability · Economics · Function (biology · Government (linguistics · Incentive · Incentive compatibility · Law and economics · Legislation · Microeconomics · Opposition (politics · Political science · Politics · Position (finance · Public economics · Veto · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Psychology · Finance
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| Citations per year | 0.62 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2013 - 2026 (14) |
| Highly cited | No |