Agenda Power in the Japanese House of Representatives
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7837866 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gary W Cox (0000-0002-9256-5193, Stanford University), Mikitaka Masuyama (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies), Mathew D Mccubbins (0000-0003-0606-2109, Duke University) |
| Year | 2000 |
| Volume | 1 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-21 |
| Publication date | 2000-05-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Japanese Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1468-1099 • E-ISSN: 1474-0060 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s1468109900000116 |
| OpenAlex | W2044488136 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 27 |
| References cited | 7 |
In this paper we provide evidence from Japan that bears on a general theory of agenda power in legislatures. By agenda power we mean the power to determine: (a) which bills are considered in the plenary session of the legislature and (b) restrictions on debate and amendment to these bills, when they are considered. While a substantial amount of work has focused on the second category of agenda power, including studies of special rules in the US House (e.g., Sinclair forthcoming), closure in the UK House of Commons (e.g., Cox, 1987; Dion, 1997), and the guillotine in the French National Assembly (e.g., Huber, 1996), there is very little on the first and arguably more fundamental sort of agenda power. This agenda power – the power to decide which bills will actually be considered on the floor of the legislature – is our focus here, and henceforth when we refer to ‘agenda power’ we shall mean this narrower conception
Economics · House of Representatives · Legislature · Lower house · Opposition (politics · Parliament · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration
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| Citations per year | 1.04 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2000 - 2025 (26) |
| Highly cited | No |