Keith Hossack
Biographic Data
| ID | 4487192 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Keith Hossack |
| GIVEN NAMES | Keith |
| FAMILY NAME | Hossack |
| SIGNATURE | HOSSACK K |
| AFFILIATIONS | King's College London |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1991 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number: What Numbers Are and How They Are Known
If numbers were objects, how could there be human knowledge of number? Numbers are not physical objects: must we conclude that we have a mysterious power of perceiving the abstract realm? Or should we instead conclude that numbers are fictions? This book argues that numbers are not objects: they are magnitude properties. Properties are not fictions and we certainly have scientific knowledge of them. Much is already known about magnitude propertie…
The Metaphysics of Knowledge
"The Metaphysics of Knowledge presents the thesis that knowledge is an absolutely fundamental relation, with an indispensable role to play in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mind and language. Knowledge has been generally assumed to be a propositional attitude like belief. But Keith Hossack argues that knowledge is not a relation to a content; rather, it a relation to a fact. This point of view allows us to explain many of the…
Consciousness in act and action
Plurals and Complexes
Atomism denies that complexes exist. Common-sense metaphysics may posit masses, composite individuals and sets, but atomism says there are only simples. In a singularist logic, it is difficult to make a plausible case for atomism. But we should accept plural logic, and then atomism can paraphrase away apparent reference to complexes. The paraphrases require unfamiliar plural universals, but these are of independent interest; for example, we can i…
Access to Mathematical Objects
Este artículo cuestiona las doctrinas usuales de que los términos matemáticos se refieren a objetos y de que las demostraciones matemáticas son deducciones lógicas. En su lugar, proponemos que captar un concepto matemático requiere típicamente dominar una técnica o un procedimiento asociado, y que diferentes demostraciones cuentan con que nosotros reflexionemos acerca de qué resultados tendrán los procedimientos pertinentes. Las demostraciones re…
Plurals and Complexes
Atomism denies that complexes exist. Common-sense metaphysics may posit masses, composite individuals and sets, but atomism says there are only simples. In a singularist logic, it is difficult to make a plausible case for atomism. But we should accept plural logic, and then atomism can paraphrase away apparent reference to complexes. The paraphrases require unfamiliar plural universals, but these are of independent interest; for example, we can i…
Access to Mathematical Objects
Este artículo cuestiona las doctrinas usuales de que los términos matemáticos se refieren a objetos y de que las demostraciones matemáticas son deducciones lógicas. En su lugar, proponemos que captar un concepto matemático requiere típicamente dominar una técnica o un procedimiento asociado, y que diferentes demostraciones cuentan con que nosotros reflexionemos acerca de qué resultados tendrán los procedimientos pertinentes. Las demostraciones re…
Plurals and Complexes
Atomism denies that complexes exist. Common-sense metaphysics may posit masses, composite individuals and sets, but atomism says there are only simples. In a singularist logic, it is difficult to make a plausible case for atomism. But we should accept plural logic, and then atomism can paraphrase away apparent reference to complexes. The paraphrases require unfamiliar plural universals, but these are of independent interest; for example, we can i…
Consciousness in act and action
The Metaphysics of Knowledge
"The Metaphysics of Knowledge presents the thesis that knowledge is an absolutely fundamental relation, with an indispensable role to play in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mind and language. Knowledge has been generally assumed to be a propositional attitude like belief. But Keith Hossack argues that knowledge is not a relation to a content; rather, it a relation to a fact. This point of view allows us to explain many of the…
Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number: What Numbers Are and How They Are Known
If numbers were objects, how could there be human knowledge of number? Numbers are not physical objects: must we conclude that we have a mysterious power of perceiving the abstract realm? Or should we instead conclude that numbers are fictions? This book argues that numbers are not objects: they are magnitude properties. Properties are not fictions and we certainly have scientific knowledge of them. Much is already known about magnitude propertie…
Philosophy (5 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Consciousness (2 works) · History and Theory of Mathematics (2 works) · Linguistics (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works)