Plurals and Complexes
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8397474 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Keith Hossack (King's College London, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2000 |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 411-443 |
| Publication date | 2000-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/51.3.411 |
| OpenAlex | W2031956844 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 13 |
| References cited | 36 |
Atomism denies that complexes exist. Common-sense metaphysics may posit masses, composite individuals and sets, but atomism says there are only simples. In a singularist logic, it is difficult to make a plausible case for atomism. But we should accept plural logic, and then atomism can paraphrase away apparent reference to complexes. The paraphrases require unfamiliar plural universals, but these are of independent interest; for example, we can identify numbers and sets with plural universals. The atomist paraphrases would fail if plurals presuppose complexes: but an Appendix shows that reference to complexes is not required in the semantics of plurals.
Atomism · Epistemology · Linguistics · Mereology · Metaphysics · Paraphrase · Plural · Problem of universals · Semantics (computer science) · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
The Nature of Ordinary Objects
Objects, Ordinary and Otherwise
Plurals and modals
Plato on Parts and Wholes
Where in the Relativistic World Are We
Love First
In defence of Higher-Level Plural Logic
Manyism as mereologicism
Why compositional nihilism dissolves puzzles
Science and the special composition question
The Cogito and sums
Speaking with Shadows
Plurals
Foundations without Foundationalism
Parts of classes
A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility
Sameness and Substance Renewed
To Be is to be a Value of a Variable (or to be Some Values of Some Variables)
Word and Object
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Against pluralism
Can there be vague objects
Plurals and Events
Frege
On plural reference and elementary set theory
Sets
Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects
Nominalist Platonism
Theories of Masses and Problems of Constitution
A More General Theory of Definite Descriptions
A Subject with no Object
Parts and Moments
Mixtures
The problems of philosophy
Cantorian set Theory and Limitation of Size
| Unique citing works | 13 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,54 |
| Citation span | 2002 - 2025 (24) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 13 |