Marc Andree Weber
Biographic Data
| ID | 4491230 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Marc Andree Weber |
| GIVEN NAMES | Marc Andree |
| FAMILY NAME | Weber |
| SIGNATURE | WEBER M A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universität Mannheim, Philosophisches Seminar Mannheim Germany |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5062-2404 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
An argument for moral evidentialism
Moral evidentialism is the view that one ought morally to believe only what is suggested by the evidence at one's disposal. As announced in the title, an argument for (a slightly restricted version of) this view is presented. The argument crucially relies on two specific links between belief and assertion, namely that one should not believe what one must not assert, and that one must not assert what is not suggested by the evidence at one's dispo…
Unknown Peers
Unknown peers create a problem for those epistemologists who argue that we should be conciliatory in cases of peer disagreement. The standard interpretation of ‘being conciliatory’ has it that we should revise our opinions concerning a specific subject matter whenever we encounter someone who is as competent and well informed as we are concerning this subject matter (and thus is our peer) and holds a different opinion. As a consequence, peers who…
Meinungsverschiedenheiten: Eine erkenntnistheoretische Analyse
No prominent works on this page.
Meinungsverschiedenheiten: Eine erkenntnistheoretische Analyse
Unknown Peers
Unknown peers create a problem for those epistemologists who argue that we should be conciliatory in cases of peer disagreement. The standard interpretation of ‘being conciliatory’ has it that we should revise our opinions concerning a specific subject matter whenever we encounter someone who is as competent and well informed as we are concerning this subject matter (and thus is our peer) and holds a different opinion. As a consequence, peers who…
An argument for moral evidentialism
Moral evidentialism is the view that one ought morally to believe only what is suggested by the evidence at one's disposal. As announced in the title, an argument for (a slightly restricted version of) this view is presented. The argument crucially relies on two specific links between belief and assertion, namely that one should not believe what one must not assert, and that one must not assert what is not suggested by the evidence at one's dispo…
Epistemology (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 works) · Dogmatism (1 works) · Dogmatism (1 works) · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies (1 works) · Free Will and Agency (1 works) · Medicine (1 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (1 works)