An argument for moral evidentialism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20142389 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Marc Andree Weber (0000-0001-5062-2404, Universität Mannheim, Philosophisches Seminar Mannheim Germany, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 90 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 583-602 |
| Publication date | 2024-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12557 |
| OpenAlex | W4402762492 |
| Language | CA |
| References cited | 35 |
Moral evidentialism is the view that one ought morally to believe only what is suggested by the evidence at one's disposal. As announced in the title, an argument for (a slightly restricted version of) this view is presented. The argument crucially relies on two specific links between belief and assertion, namely that one should not believe what one must not assert, and that one must not assert what is not suggested by the evidence at one's disposal. In both cases, the normativity involved is moral. The links are established, and it is shown how to deal with seemingly apparent counterexamples
Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Medicine · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
Character as Moral Fiction
Belief's Own Ethics
Without Justification
Friendship and Belief
What we epistemically owe to each other
Radical moral encroachment
Reasonable Religious Disagreements
Epistemic Partiality in Friendship
The structure of moral encroachment
Epistemic Permissiveness
Epistemology of Disagreement
Epistemic Judgement and Motivation
Justified Judging
A New Argument for Evidentialism
Two Arguments for Evidentialism
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |