Epistemic Judgement and Motivation

Bibliographic Data

ID10690963
AuthorsCameron Boult (0000-0001-8488-9449, Brandon University), Sebastian Köhler (0000-0002-0140-4619, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management)
Year2020
Volume70
Issue281
Pages738-758
Publication date2020-09-17
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqaa007
OpenAlexW3012377090
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited30

Is there an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism? The answer to this question has implications for our understanding of the nature of epistemic normativity. For example, some philosophers have argued from claims that epistemic judgement is not necessarily motivating to the view that epistemic judgement is not normative. This paper examines the options for spelling out an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism. It is argued that the most promising approach connects epistemic judgements to doxastic dispositions, which are related to motivation in a fairly tenuous sense. It is also argued that this approach currently lacks a plausible and informative account of the nature and workings of these doxastic dispositions, and, hence, an explanation of the range of phenomena internalist theses typically set out to explain. The most promising route for developing such an account, based on recent expressivist work, is investigated and found inadequate for the task

Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Expressivism · Internalism and externalism · Judgement · Normative · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology

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