Impassioned Belief
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8093960 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Martin Ridge (0000-0003-0915-7285, corresponding author), Michael Ridge |
| Year | 2014 |
| Pages | 264 |
| Publication date | 2014-03-13 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Impassioned Belief (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682669.001.0001 |
| OpenAlex | W4205587233 |
| Open Library | OL26152521M |
| ISBN | 9780199682669 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 82 |
Michael Ridge presents an original expressivist theory of normative judgments which offers distinctive treatments of key problems in metaethics, semantics, and practical reasoning. He argues that normative judgments are hybrid states partly constituted by ordinary beliefs and partly constituted by desire-like states
Context (archaeology · Epistemology · Expressivism · Normative · Rationality · Semantics (computer science · Sociology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Medieval Philosophy and Theology · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology · Ethics · Judgment (ethics) · Metaethics · Metaethik · Normative Ethik · Normativity (Ethics) · Philosophy
Aesthetic Judgments, Evaluative Content, and (Hybrid) Expressivism
Pleasure is Goodness; Morality is Universal
Moral blame and rational criticism
Socratic reductionism in ethics
It’s common sense – you don’t need to believe to disagree
Is Rationality Normative for Reasoning
Normative Reference as a Normative Question
Expressivism, but at a Whole Other Level
Proper Function and Ethical Judgment Towards A Biosemantic Theory of Ethical Thought and Discourse
Indeterminacy and Normativity
The Real Myth of Coherence
Agent-Relative Reasons as Second-Order Value Responses
How to Have Your Quasi-Cake and Quasi-Eat It Too
Creeping Minimalism and Subject Matter
Memes, Misinformation, and Political Meaning
Argumentatively Navigating Deep Disagreements
Perverse Reasons
Supervenience, expressivism and theistic ethics
Should expressivists go global
Two roles for reasons
Naturalism and normative cognition
Interpretative expressivism
Handling rejection
Why bother with so what
Normative disagreement
Error, consistency and triviality
Good people are not like good knives
Superspreading the word
Testimonial desire
Is expressivism theologically acceptable
Topic Continuity in Conceptual Engineering and Beyond
Expressivism, inferentialism, and the status of attitudes
Disagreement for pluralists
Topics, disputes and ‘going meta’
Pretence fictionalism about the non-present
The Acquaintance Inference and Hybrid Expressivism
On Scepticism About Ought Simpliciter
Disagreement for Dialetheists
Reconsidering the Meta‐ethical Implications of Motivational Internalism and Externalism
Relational Expressivism and Moore's Paradox
Expressivism Worth the Name
Expressivism and Moore's Paradox
Practical Commitment in Normative Discourse
Moral Disagreement and the Question Under Discussion
Against Being For
Are All Normative Judgments Desire-Like
Metaethical Contextualism, Triviality and Semantic Blindness
How the Rejection of Incompatible Speech Acts Transforms Human Cognition
The Muddled Moral Mind
Fragmentation and expression
Quasi-realism and normative certitude
Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology
The nature of disagreement
Having a disagreement
Disagreement and inconsistency
Normative certitude for expressivists
The independence of (in)coherence
Moral inferentialism and moral psychology
Shopping for truth pluralism
Narrow-scoping for wide-scopers
Free will expressivism
Normative Reference Magnets
The Norm of Belief
An Ecumenical Matter
Epistemic Judgement and Motivation
Non-Descriptive Negation for Normative Sentences
Noncognitivism and the Frege‐Geach Problem in Formal Epistemology
Noncognitivism without expressivism
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence
Relaxed realism and normative belief
The Amoralist and the Anaesthetic
Quasirealism as semantic dispensability
Enkrasia for Non-Cognitivists
Error and the Limits of Quasi-Realism
Ought’-contextualism beyond the parochial
Le quasi-réalisme et l'argument de la coïncidence
Moral Reasons, Epistemic Reasons and Rationality
Practical Oomph
Epistemic Challenges to Moral Expressivism
What is Global Expressivism
Sidestepping the Frege-Geach Problem
Desire That Amounts to Knowledge
| Unique citing works | 82 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 6,83 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2026 (13) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 82 |