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Filip Grgić

Biographic Data

ID4503496
NAMEFilip Grgić
GIVEN NAMESFilip
FAMILY NAMEGrgić
SIGNATUREGRGIĆ F
AFFILIATIONSInstitut za filozofiju
ORCID0000-0003-2130-3548
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS8
TOTAL CITATIONS1
WORKS AS AUTHOR7
WORKS AS EDITOR1
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2002
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2021
H-INDEX1
  • Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in Aristotle

    Filip Grgić•ARTICLE•International Journal of…•2021

    This paper is a discussion of Aristotle’s account of actions that come about because of ignorance as found in his Nicomachean Ethics 3.1. I argue that such actions do not originate in the agent, but can rather be seen as a subclass of lucky events. Aristotle makes a distinction between two types of actions that come about because of ignorance: those that are painful or regretted (involuntary actions) and those that are not (non-voluntary actions)…

  • Free Will & Action

    Open Access•Filip Grgić, Davor Pećnjak•EDITOR•BOOK•Free Will & Action•2018

  • Investigative and Suspensive Scepticism

    Open Access•Filip Grgić•ARTICLE•European Journal of Philosophy•2014

    Sextus Empiricus portrays the Pyrrhonian sceptics in two radically different ways. On the one hand, he describes them as inquirers or examiners, and insists that what distinguishes them from all the other philosophical schools is their persistent engagement in inquiry. On the other hand, he insists that the main feature of Pyrrhonian attitude is suspension of judgement about everything. Many have argued that a consistent account of Sextan sceptic…

  • Method and Metaphysics

    Filip Grgić•ARTICLE•History and Philosophy of Logic•2012

    A review of Jonathan Barnes's Method and Metaphysics.

  • Sextus Empiricus on the Possibility of Inquiry

    Open Access•Filip Grgić•ARTICLE•Pacific philosophical quarterly•2008

    In this paper I discuss Sextus Empiricus’ response to the dogmatists’ objection that the skeptics cannot inquire into philosophical theories and at the same time suspend judgment about everything. I argue that his strategy consists in putting the burden of proof on the dogmatists: it is they, and not the skeptics, who must justify the claim to be able to inquire into the nature of things. Sextus’ arguments purport to show that if we consider the …

  • Aristotle's Notion of Experience

    Pavel Gregoric, Filip Grgić•ARTICLE•Archiv für Geschichte der…•2006

    Aristotle's notion of experience plays an important role in his epistemology as the link between perception and memory on the one side, and higher cognitive capacities on the other side. However, Aristotle does not say much about it, and what he does say seems inconsistent. Notably, some passages suggest that it is a non-rational capacity, others that it is a rational capacity and that it provides the principles of science. This paper presents a …

  • Sextus Empiricus on the Goal of Skepticism

    Filip Grgić, Inc Mathesis Publications•ARTICLE•Ancient Philosophy•2006

    In this paper I take a closer look at Sextus Empiricus' arguments in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.25-30 and try to make sense of his account of Skepticism as a goal-directed philosophy. I argue that Sextus fails to mount a convincing case for the view that tranquility, rather than suspension of judgment, is the ultimate goal of his inquiries.

  • Aristotle on the Akratic's Knowledge

    Filip Grgić•ARTICLE•Phronesis•2002•Cited by: 1

    This paper is an analysis of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics 7.3. Aristotle's discussion in this chapter is motivated by the Socratic doctrine, elaborated in Plato's Protagoras, according to which it is impossible to know what is good and act against this knowledge. Aristotle wants to rebut this doctrine and show that there is a sense of "know" such that this is possible. I argue that this is all that he wants to do in EN 7.3, and that his discuss…

  • Aristotle on the Akratic's Knowledge

    Filip Grgić•ARTICLE•Phronesis•2002•Cited by: 1

    This paper is an analysis of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics 7.3. Aristotle's discussion in this chapter is motivated by the Socratic doctrine, elaborated in Plato's Protagoras, according to which it is impossible to know what is good and act against this knowledge. Aristotle wants to rebut this doctrine and show that there is a sense of "know" such that this is possible. I argue that this is all that he wants to do in EN 7.3, and that his discuss…

  • Aristotle on the Akratic's Knowledge

    Filip Grgić•ARTICLE•Phronesis•2002•Cited by: 1

    This paper is an analysis of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics 7.3. Aristotle's discussion in this chapter is motivated by the Socratic doctrine, elaborated in Plato's Protagoras, according to which it is impossible to know what is good and act against this knowledge. Aristotle wants to rebut this doctrine and show that there is a sense of "know" such that this is possible. I argue that this is all that he wants to do in EN 7.3, and that his discuss…

  • Aristotle's Notion of Experience

    Pavel Gregoric, Filip Grgić•ARTICLE•Archiv für Geschichte der…•2006

    Aristotle's notion of experience plays an important role in his epistemology as the link between perception and memory on the one side, and higher cognitive capacities on the other side. However, Aristotle does not say much about it, and what he does say seems inconsistent. Notably, some passages suggest that it is a non-rational capacity, others that it is a rational capacity and that it provides the principles of science. This paper presents a …

  • Sextus Empiricus on the Goal of Skepticism

    Filip Grgić, Inc Mathesis Publications•ARTICLE•Ancient Philosophy•2006

    In this paper I take a closer look at Sextus Empiricus' arguments in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.25-30 and try to make sense of his account of Skepticism as a goal-directed philosophy. I argue that Sextus fails to mount a convincing case for the view that tranquility, rather than suspension of judgment, is the ultimate goal of his inquiries.

  • Sextus Empiricus on the Possibility of Inquiry

    Open Access•Filip Grgić•ARTICLE•Pacific philosophical quarterly•2008

    In this paper I discuss Sextus Empiricus’ response to the dogmatists’ objection that the skeptics cannot inquire into philosophical theories and at the same time suspend judgment about everything. I argue that his strategy consists in putting the burden of proof on the dogmatists: it is they, and not the skeptics, who must justify the claim to be able to inquire into the nature of things. Sextus’ arguments purport to show that if we consider the …

  • Method and Metaphysics

    Filip Grgić•ARTICLE•History and Philosophy of Logic•2012

    A review of Jonathan Barnes's Method and Metaphysics.

  • Investigative and Suspensive Scepticism

    Open Access•Filip Grgić•ARTICLE•European Journal of Philosophy•2014

    Sextus Empiricus portrays the Pyrrhonian sceptics in two radically different ways. On the one hand, he describes them as inquirers or examiners, and insists that what distinguishes them from all the other philosophical schools is their persistent engagement in inquiry. On the other hand, he insists that the main feature of Pyrrhonian attitude is suspension of judgement about everything. Many have argued that a consistent account of Sextan sceptic…

  • Free Will & Action

    Open Access•Filip Grgić, Davor Pećnjak•EDITOR•BOOK•Free Will & Action•2018

  • Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in Aristotle

    Filip Grgić•ARTICLE•International Journal of…•2021

    This paper is a discussion of Aristotle’s account of actions that come about because of ignorance as found in his Nicomachean Ethics 3.1. I argue that such actions do not originate in the agent, but can rather be seen as a subclass of lucky events. Aristotle makes a distinction between two types of actions that come about because of ignorance: those that are painful or regretted (involuntary actions) and those that are not (non-voluntary actions)…

Epistemology (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (7 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Skepticism (3 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Medieval and Classical Philosophy (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Action (physics (1 work)

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