Ignorance, Involuntariness, and Regret in Aristotle

Bibliographic Data

ID21604217
AuthorsFilip Grgić (0000-0003-2130-3548, Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume29
Issue3
Pages351-369
Publication date2021-05-27
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0967-2559 • E-ISSN: 1466-4542
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09672559.2021.1970790
OpenAlexW3200928435
LanguageEN
References cited18

This paper is a discussion of Aristotle’s account of actions that come about because of ignorance as found in his Nicomachean Ethics 3.1. I argue that such actions do not originate in the agent, but can rather be seen as a subclass of lucky events. Aristotle makes a distinction between two types of actions that come about because of ignorance: those that are painful or regretted (involuntary actions) and those that are not (non-voluntary actions). I argue that involuntary actions that come about because of ignorance are painful for basically the same reason as forced actions. They include the mismatch between the person’s capacity as the agent and the fact that it happened to her that she did something even though, qua agent, she contributed nothing, so that she is reduced, as it were, to the mere vehicle of luck

Economic Justice · Epistemology · Ignorance · Luck · Nothing · Political science · Regret · Veil of ignorance · Ethics in medical practice · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy

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