Nicholas Colgrove
Biographic Data
| ID | 4504118 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nicholas Colgrove |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nicholas |
| FAMILY NAME | Colgrove |
| SIGNATURE | COLGROVE N |
| AFFILIATIONS | Wake Forest University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0506-353X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 16 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 16 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Abortion and Infant Mortality
Alison Gemmill et al. claim that infant mortality in Texas increased following its 2021 abortion restrictions, and several sources reported that abortion restrictions harm infants. This is misleading. Gemmill et al.'s findings show that infant deaths increased primarily because abortion for “congenital anomalies” decreased, and a subset of those subjects died in infancy. In other words, infant mortality rose because fetal mortality fell. By analo…
Correspondence on “defining ‘abortion’”
Abortion, infanticide and bodily rights
James Robinson defends the claim that abortion and infanticide are morally distinct. This claim is defensible, he argues, because we have good reasons to condemn infanticide that do not apply to abortion. Specifically, Robinson claims that infanticide involves violation of infants’ bodily rights. Abortion does not involve the violation of fetuses’ bodily rights, however, because fetuses do not have bodily rights. Here, I offer a response. Robinso…
Defining ‘Abortion’
In Dobbs v. Jackson , the Supreme Court found that ‘the Constitution does not confer a right to abortion.’ Rather, individual states must determine whether a right to abortion exists. Following Dobbs , state abortion laws have diverged significantly. This has generated confusion over what the law permits. Consequently, some pregnant women reportedly have not received timely treatment for life-threatening conditions. Clear guidance on abortion pol…
No, pregnancy is not a disease
Anna Smajdor and Joona Räsänen argue that we have good reason to classify pregnancy as a disease. They discuss five accounts of disease and argue that each account either implies that pregnancy is a disease or if it does not, it faces problems. This strategy allows Smajdor and Räsänen to avoid articulating their own account of disease. Consequently, they cannot establish that pregnancy is a disease, only that plausible accounts of disease suggest…
The Moral Difficulty of Embryo-Friendly IVF
Defending the Doctrine of the Mean Against Counterexamples
Aristotle's doctrine of the mean states that each moral virtue stands opposed to two types of vice: one of excess and one of deficiency, respectively. Critics claim that some virtues – like honesty, fair‐mindedness, and patience – are counterexamples to Aristotle's doctrine. Here, I develop a generalizable strategy to defend the doctrine of the mean against such counterexamples. I argue that not only is the doctrine of the mean defensible, but ta…
Deception, intention and clinical practice
Regarding the appropriateness of deception in clinical practice, two (apparently conflicting) claims are often emphasised. First, that ‘clinicians should not deceive their patients.’ Second, that deception is sometimes ‘in a patient’s best interest.’ Recently, Hardman has worked towards resolving this conflict by exploring ways in which deceptive and non-deceptive practices extend beyond consideration of patients’ beliefs. In short, some practice…
Inconsistency arguments still do not matter
William Simkulet has recently criticised Colgrove et al ’s defence against what they have called inconsistency arguments—arguments that claim opponents of abortion (OAs) act in ways inconsistent with their underlying beliefs about human fetuses (eg, that human fetuses are persons at conception). Colgrove et al presented three objections to inconsistency arguments, which Simkulet argues are unconvincing. Further, he maintains that OAs who hold tha…
In defence of newborns
Recently, I argued that subjects inside of artificial wombs—termed ‘gestatelings’ by Romanis—share the same legal and moral status as newborns (neonates). Gestatelings, on my view, are persons in both a legal and moral sense. Kingma challenges these claims. Specifically, Kingma argues that my previous argument is invalid, as it equivocates on the term ‘newborn’. Kingma concludes that questions about the legal and moral status of gestatelings rema…
Moral enhancement, acquired virtue, and theism
Recently, Brummett and Crutchfield advanced two critiques of theists who object to moral enhancement. First, a conceptual critique: theists who oppose moral enhancement commonly do so because virtue is thought to be acquired only via a special kind of process. Enhancement does not involve such processes. Hence, enhancement cannot produce virtue. Yet theists also commonly claim that God is perfectly virtuous and not subject to processes. If virtue…
Agency, Pregnancy and Persons
Gestaticide
The rapid development of artificial womb technologies means that we must consider if and when it is permissible to kill the human subject of ectogestation—recently termed a ‘gestateling’ by Elizabeth Chloe Romanis—prior to ‘birth’. We describe the act of deliberately killing the gestateling as gestaticide and argue that there are good reasons to maintain that gestaticide is morally equivalent to infanticide, which we consider to be morally imperm…
Prolife hypocrisy
Opponents of abortion are often described as ‘inconsistent’ (hypocrites) in terms of their beliefs, actions and/or priorities. They are alleged to do too little to combat spontaneous abortion, they should be adopting cryopreserved embryos with greater frequency and so on. These types of arguments—which we call ‘inconsistency arguments’—conform to a common pattern. Each specifies what consistent opponents of abortion would do (or believe), asserts…
Frozen embryos and the obligation to adopt
Rob Lovering has developed an interesting new critique of views that regard embryos as equally valuable as other human beings: the moral argument for frozen human embryo adoption. The argument is aimed at those who believe that the death of a frozen embryo is a very bad thing, and Lovering concludes that some who hold this view ought to prevent one of these deaths by adopting and gestating a frozen embryo. Contra Lovering, we show that there are …
The Emotional Impact of Evil
In The Brothers Karamazov , Dostoyevsky illustrates that encounters with evil do not solely impact agents’ beliefs about God (or God’s existence). Evil impacts people on an emotional level as well. Authors like Hasker and van Inwagen sometimes identify the emotional impact of evil with the “existential” problem of evil. For better or worse, the existential version of the problem is often set aside in contemporary philosophical discussions. In thi…
No prominent works on this page.
The Emotional Impact of Evil
In The Brothers Karamazov , Dostoyevsky illustrates that encounters with evil do not solely impact agents’ beliefs about God (or God’s existence). Evil impacts people on an emotional level as well. Authors like Hasker and van Inwagen sometimes identify the emotional impact of evil with the “existential” problem of evil. For better or worse, the existential version of the problem is often set aside in contemporary philosophical discussions. In thi…
Frozen embryos and the obligation to adopt
Rob Lovering has developed an interesting new critique of views that regard embryos as equally valuable as other human beings: the moral argument for frozen human embryo adoption. The argument is aimed at those who believe that the death of a frozen embryo is a very bad thing, and Lovering concludes that some who hold this view ought to prevent one of these deaths by adopting and gestating a frozen embryo. Contra Lovering, we show that there are …
Gestaticide
The rapid development of artificial womb technologies means that we must consider if and when it is permissible to kill the human subject of ectogestation—recently termed a ‘gestateling’ by Elizabeth Chloe Romanis—prior to ‘birth’. We describe the act of deliberately killing the gestateling as gestaticide and argue that there are good reasons to maintain that gestaticide is morally equivalent to infanticide, which we consider to be morally imperm…
Prolife hypocrisy
Opponents of abortion are often described as ‘inconsistent’ (hypocrites) in terms of their beliefs, actions and/or priorities. They are alleged to do too little to combat spontaneous abortion, they should be adopting cryopreserved embryos with greater frequency and so on. These types of arguments—which we call ‘inconsistency arguments’—conform to a common pattern. Each specifies what consistent opponents of abortion would do (or believe), asserts…
Inconsistency arguments still do not matter
William Simkulet has recently criticised Colgrove et al ’s defence against what they have called inconsistency arguments—arguments that claim opponents of abortion (OAs) act in ways inconsistent with their underlying beliefs about human fetuses (eg, that human fetuses are persons at conception). Colgrove et al presented three objections to inconsistency arguments, which Simkulet argues are unconvincing. Further, he maintains that OAs who hold tha…
In defence of newborns
Recently, I argued that subjects inside of artificial wombs—termed ‘gestatelings’ by Romanis—share the same legal and moral status as newborns (neonates). Gestatelings, on my view, are persons in both a legal and moral sense. Kingma challenges these claims. Specifically, Kingma argues that my previous argument is invalid, as it equivocates on the term ‘newborn’. Kingma concludes that questions about the legal and moral status of gestatelings rema…
Moral enhancement, acquired virtue, and theism
Recently, Brummett and Crutchfield advanced two critiques of theists who object to moral enhancement. First, a conceptual critique: theists who oppose moral enhancement commonly do so because virtue is thought to be acquired only via a special kind of process. Enhancement does not involve such processes. Hence, enhancement cannot produce virtue. Yet theists also commonly claim that God is perfectly virtuous and not subject to processes. If virtue…
Agency, Pregnancy and Persons
Deception, intention and clinical practice
Regarding the appropriateness of deception in clinical practice, two (apparently conflicting) claims are often emphasised. First, that ‘clinicians should not deceive their patients.’ Second, that deception is sometimes ‘in a patient’s best interest.’ Recently, Hardman has worked towards resolving this conflict by exploring ways in which deceptive and non-deceptive practices extend beyond consideration of patients’ beliefs. In short, some practice…
Defending the Doctrine of the Mean Against Counterexamples
Aristotle's doctrine of the mean states that each moral virtue stands opposed to two types of vice: one of excess and one of deficiency, respectively. Critics claim that some virtues – like honesty, fair‐mindedness, and patience – are counterexamples to Aristotle's doctrine. Here, I develop a generalizable strategy to defend the doctrine of the mean against such counterexamples. I argue that not only is the doctrine of the mean defensible, but ta…
Defining ‘Abortion’
In Dobbs v. Jackson , the Supreme Court found that ‘the Constitution does not confer a right to abortion.’ Rather, individual states must determine whether a right to abortion exists. Following Dobbs , state abortion laws have diverged significantly. This has generated confusion over what the law permits. Consequently, some pregnant women reportedly have not received timely treatment for life-threatening conditions. Clear guidance on abortion pol…
No, pregnancy is not a disease
Anna Smajdor and Joona Räsänen argue that we have good reason to classify pregnancy as a disease. They discuss five accounts of disease and argue that each account either implies that pregnancy is a disease or if it does not, it faces problems. This strategy allows Smajdor and Räsänen to avoid articulating their own account of disease. Consequently, they cannot establish that pregnancy is a disease, only that plausible accounts of disease suggest…
The Moral Difficulty of Embryo-Friendly IVF
Abortion and Infant Mortality
Alison Gemmill et al. claim that infant mortality in Texas increased following its 2021 abortion restrictions, and several sources reported that abortion restrictions harm infants. This is misleading. Gemmill et al.'s findings show that infant deaths increased primarily because abortion for “congenital anomalies” decreased, and a subset of those subjects died in infancy. In other words, infant mortality rose because fetal mortality fell. By analo…
Correspondence on “defining ‘abortion’”
Abortion, infanticide and bodily rights
James Robinson defends the claim that abortion and infanticide are morally distinct. This claim is defensible, he argues, because we have good reasons to condemn infanticide that do not apply to abortion. Specifically, Robinson claims that infanticide involves violation of infants’ bodily rights. Abortion does not involve the violation of fetuses’ bodily rights, however, because fetuses do not have bodily rights. Here, I offer a response. Robinso…
Philosophy (8 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Reproductive Health and Technologies (8 works) · Epistemology (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Political science (7 works) · Abortion (6 works) · Pregnancy (6 works) · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations (5 works) · Reproductive Health and Contraception (5 works)