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No, pregnancy is not a disease

Bibliographic Data

ID21514583
AuthorsNicholas Colgrove (0000-0003-0506-353X, Augusta University, corresponding author), Daniel Rodger (0000-0002-2121-7167, London South Bank University)
Year2025
Volume51
Issue1
Pages45-47
Publication date2025-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Medical Ethics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0306-6800 • E-ISSN: 1473-4257
PublisherBMJ (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1136/jme-2024-109922
PMID38749648
OpenAlexW4396938815
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited6

Anna Smajdor and Joona Räsänen argue that we have good reason to classify pregnancy as a disease. They discuss five accounts of disease and argue that each account either implies that pregnancy is a disease or if it does not, it faces problems. This strategy allows Smajdor and Räsänen to avoid articulating their own account of disease. Consequently, they cannot establish that pregnancy is a disease, only that plausible accounts of disease suggest this. Some readers will dismiss Smajdor and Räsänen’s claims as counterintuitive. By analogy, if a mathematical proof concludes ‘2+2=5’, readers will know—without investigation—that an error occurred. Rather than dismiss Smajdor and Räsänen’s work, however, the easiest way to undermine their argument is to describe at least one plausible account of disease that (1) excludes pregnancy and (2) avoids the problems they raise for it. This is our strategy. We focus on dysfunction accounts of disease. After outlining Smajdor and Räsänen’s main arguments against dysfunction accounts, we explain why pregnancy is not a disease on these accounts. Next, we defend dysfunction accounts against the three problems that Smajdor and Räsänen raise. If successful, then contra Smajdor and Räsänen, at least one plausible account of disease does not imply that pregnancy is a disease. We suspect that defenders of other accounts can respond similarly. Yet, we note that insofar as dysfunction accounts align with the commonsense intuition that pregnancy is not a disease, this, all else being equal, seems like a point in their favour

Counterintuitive · Criminology · Disease · Epistemology · Intuition · Pathology · Pregnancy · Suspect · Medicine · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Psychotherapy Techniques and Applications · Internal Medicine

  • The Metaphysics of Pregnancy

    Open Access•Francesca Bellazzi•Philosophy Compass•2025

  • Defending the disease view of pregnancy

    Joona Räsänen, Anna Smajdor•Journal of Medical Ethics•2025

  • Response to

    Ognjen Arandjelović•Journal of Medical Ethics•2026

  • Why pregnancy is not a disease

    Xueshi Wang•Journal of Medical Ethics•2025

  • Is pregnancy a disease? A normative approach

    Open Access•Anna Smajdor, Joona Räsänen•Journal of Medical Ethics•2025

  • Age change in healthcare settings

    Joona Räsänen•Journal of Medical Ethics•2020

  • How to Derive "Ought" From "Is

    John R Searle•The Philosophical Review•1964

  • The concept of mental disorder

    Jerome C Wakefield•American Psychologist•1992

Unique citing works4
Citations per year4
Citation span2025 - 2026 (2)
Citation velocitycurrent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 3

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