V C Chappell
Biographic Data
| ID | 4561341 |
|---|---|
| NAME | V C Chappell |
| GIVEN NAMES | V C |
| FAMILY NAME | Chappell |
| SIGNATURE | CHAPPELL V C |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1960 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1968 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The Concept of a Person and Other Essays
Hume
The Philosophy of Mind
The Concept of Dreaming
The Concept of Dreaming V. C. Chappell V. C. Chappell University of Chicago Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 13, Issue 52, July 1963, Pages 193–213, https://doi.org/10.2307/2955487 Published: 01 July 1963
Dreaming
Sameness and Change
CAN something change and yet remain the same thing? Many philosophers have denied that it can. Change and self-identity, they have held, are incompatible. Some have concluded, on the supposition that self-identity is a necessary condition of a thing, that things do not change-things, that is, in the true and proper sense of the word, real things. Parmenides and Plato are ancient philosophers who drew this conclusion, and it has been drawn in rece…
The Philosophy of Mind
The Concept of Dreaming
The Concept of Dreaming V. C. Chappell V. C. Chappell University of Chicago Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 13, Issue 52, July 1963, Pages 193–213, https://doi.org/10.2307/2955487 Published: 01 July 1963
Sameness and Change
CAN something change and yet remain the same thing? Many philosophers have denied that it can. Change and self-identity, they have held, are incompatible. Some have concluded, on the supposition that self-identity is a necessary condition of a thing, that things do not change-things, that is, in the true and proper sense of the word, real things. Parmenides and Plato are ancient philosophers who drew this conclusion, and it has been drawn in rece…
Sameness and Change
CAN something change and yet remain the same thing? Many philosophers have denied that it can. Change and self-identity, they have held, are incompatible. Some have concluded, on the supposition that self-identity is a necessary condition of a thing, that things do not change-things, that is, in the true and proper sense of the word, real things. Parmenides and Plato are ancient philosophers who drew this conclusion, and it has been drawn in rece…
Dreaming
The Concept of Dreaming
The Concept of Dreaming V. C. Chappell V. C. Chappell University of Chicago Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 13, Issue 52, July 1963, Pages 193–213, https://doi.org/10.2307/2955487 Published: 01 July 1963
The Philosophy of Mind
Hume
The Concept of a Person and Other Essays
Philosophy (6 works) · Analytic philosophy (3 works) · Contemporary philosophy (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · General interest (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · 1711-1776 (1 works) · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology (1 works) · Art (1 works)