Paul Henne
Biographic Data
| ID | 460127 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Paul Henne |
| GIVEN NAMES | Paul |
| FAMILY NAME | Henne |
| SIGNATURE | HENNE P |
| AFFILIATIONS | Lake Forest College |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3526-2911 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 21 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 12 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1989 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
No evidence that reversibility affects causal judgments in late-preemption cases
Recently, Ross and Woodward (2022) argued that the reversibility of an outcome – that is, whether the outcome can be undone – affects causal judgments. One prediction of their account is that reversibility affects causal judgments in late-preemption scenarios, where people typically judge that events that produce the outcome earlier are more causal than preempted alternative events that would have otherwise produced the outcome. Ross and Woodward…
A counterfactual explanation for recency effects in double prevention scenarios
Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action
Epistemologists have long believed that epistemic luck undermines propositional knowledge. Action theorists have long believed that agentive luck undermines intentional action. But is there a relationship between agentive luck and epistemic luck? While agentive luck and epistemic luck have been widely thought to be independent phenomena, we argue that agentive luck has an epistemic dimension. We present several thought experiments where epistemic…
The know-how solution to Kraemer's puzzle
Confidence and gradation in causal judgment
Making moral principles suit yourself
Counterfactual thinking and recency effects in causal judgment
Perceived similarity of imagined possible worlds affects judgments of counterfactual plausibility
Resistance to Position Change, Motivated Reasoning, and Polarization
Recent experimental work on "ought" implies "can
While philosophers generally accept some version of the principle "ought" implies "can," recent work in experimental philosophy and cognitive science provides evidence against a presupposition or a conceptual entailment from "ought" to "can." Here, we review some of this evidence, its effect on particular formulations of the principle, and future directions for cognitive scientists and philosophers
Separating human and climatic impacts on Mediterranean forests
La polysémie allégorique dans le Pasteur d'Hermas
La polysemie allegorique consiste a donner successivement differentes significations aux memes elements narratifs. Elle a contribue a la reputation d'obscurite et de confusion du Pasteur. Elle releve, en fait, d'une technique interpretative elaboree et peut etre mise en rapport avec le phenomene de coherence interne des niveaux d'explication. L'emploi de ce meme procede stylistique a travers tout le Pasteur pose a nouveau le probleme de sa redact…
Resistance to Position Change, Motivated Reasoning, and Polarization
Recent experimental work on "ought" implies "can
While philosophers generally accept some version of the principle "ought" implies "can," recent work in experimental philosophy and cognitive science provides evidence against a presupposition or a conceptual entailment from "ought" to "can." Here, we review some of this evidence, its effect on particular formulations of the principle, and future directions for cognitive scientists and philosophers
La polysémie allégorique dans le Pasteur d'Hermas
La polysemie allegorique consiste a donner successivement differentes significations aux memes elements narratifs. Elle a contribue a la reputation d'obscurite et de confusion du Pasteur. Elle releve, en fait, d'une technique interpretative elaboree et peut etre mise en rapport avec le phenomene de coherence interne des niveaux d'explication. L'emploi de ce meme procede stylistique a travers tout le Pasteur pose a nouveau le probleme de sa redact…
Separating human and climatic impacts on Mediterranean forests
Recent experimental work on "ought" implies "can
While philosophers generally accept some version of the principle "ought" implies "can," recent work in experimental philosophy and cognitive science provides evidence against a presupposition or a conceptual entailment from "ought" to "can." Here, we review some of this evidence, its effect on particular formulations of the principle, and future directions for cognitive scientists and philosophers
Resistance to Position Change, Motivated Reasoning, and Polarization
Making moral principles suit yourself
Counterfactual thinking and recency effects in causal judgment
Perceived similarity of imagined possible worlds affects judgments of counterfactual plausibility
Confidence and gradation in causal judgment
Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action
Epistemologists have long believed that epistemic luck undermines propositional knowledge. Action theorists have long believed that agentive luck undermines intentional action. But is there a relationship between agentive luck and epistemic luck? While agentive luck and epistemic luck have been widely thought to be independent phenomena, we argue that agentive luck has an epistemic dimension. We present several thought experiments where epistemic…
The know-how solution to Kraemer's puzzle
A counterfactual explanation for recency effects in double prevention scenarios
No evidence that reversibility affects causal judgments in late-preemption cases
Recently, Ross and Woodward (2022) argued that the reversibility of an outcome – that is, whether the outcome can be undone – affects causal judgments. One prediction of their account is that reversibility affects causal judgments in late-preemption scenarios, where people typically judge that events that produce the outcome earlier are more causal than preempted alternative events that would have otherwise produced the outcome. Ross and Woodward…
Psychology (11 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (9 works) · Epistemology (8 works) · Social Psychology (8 works) · Cognitive psychology (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Cognition (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (4 works)