Recent experimental work on "ought" implies "can
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4080074 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jen Semler (0000-0003-0621-749X, Duke University), Paul Henne (0000-0002-3526-2911, Duke University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue | 9 |
| Publication date | 2019-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.12619 |
| OpenAlex | W2965239855 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 31 |
While philosophers generally accept some version of the principle "ought" implies "can," recent work in experimental philosophy and cognitive science provides evidence against a presupposition or a conceptual entailment from "ought" to "can." Here, we review some of this evidence, its effect on particular formulations of the principle, and future directions for cognitive scientists and philosophers
Cognition · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Logical consequence · Philosophy of science · Physics · Presupposition · Quantum mechanics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Critique of Pure Reason
The Concept of Moral Obligation
Philosophy without Intuitions
Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection
Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non‐Philosophers
I Ought, Therefore I Can
Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds
Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’? And Did Kant Think It Does
Intuitions, reflective judgments, and experimental philosophy
Ought' Conversationally Implies `Can
Moral Aspirations and Ideals
Kant and 'Ought Implies Can
| Citations per year | 1.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |