Alva Noë
Biographic Data
| ID | 460700 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Alva Noë |
| GIVEN NAMES | Alva |
| FAMILY NAME | Noë |
| SIGNATURE | NOË A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California, Berkeley |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3168-2708 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 21 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 35 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 20 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Entanglement
The Entanglement
Death and Entanglement
Learning to Look
The enactive approach
Entanglement and Ecstasy in Dance, Music, and Philosophy
Dance and music serve in this essay to exemplify both the looping entanglement of art and life as well as the account of art and philosophy developed in Strange Tools. This essay replies to criticisms of Carrie Noland, Nancy S. Struever, and Thomas Rickert and also offers a briefer restatement of the general approach
Strange Tools
Art and Entanglement in Strange Tools
Varieties of Presence
The world shows up for us—it is present in our thought and perception. But, as Alva Noë contends in his latest exploration of the problem of consciousness, it doesn’t show up for free. The world is not simply available; it is achieved rather than given. As with a painting in a gallery, the world has no meaning—no presence to be experienced—apart from our able engagement with it. We must show up, too, and bring along what knowledge and skills we’v…
Conscious Reference
The world shows up to perceptual consciousness in virtue of the deployment of distinct sensorimotor and also conceptual skills. The availability of the world to thought, is, in contrast, to be explained in connection with the different sorts of skills put to work in thought. I show that thought and experience are varieties of skilful access to the world. The aim of the paper is to present the outlines of a general theory of access
Reply to Campbell, Martin, and Kelly
Précis of Action In Perception
The Problem with the Picture Picture of Visual Experience
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Magic Realism and the Limits of Intelligibility
Against intellectualism
Against intellectualism Alva Noë Alva Noë University of CaliforniaBerkeley California 94720-2390, [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 65, Issue 4, October 2005, Pages 278–290, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/65.4.278 Published: 01 October 2005
Vision and Mind
The philosophy of perception is a microcosm of the metaphysics of mind. Its central problems—What is perception? What is the nature of perceptual consciousness? How can one fit an account of perceptual experience into a broader account of the nature of the mind and the world?—are at the heart of metaphysics. Rather than try to cover all of the many strands in the philosophy of perception, this book focuses on a particular orthodoxy about the natu…
Is Perspectival Self-Consciousness Non-Conceptual
As perceivers we are able to keep track of the ways in which our perceptual experience depends on what we do (e.g., on our movements). This capacity, which Hurley calls perspectival self‐consciousness, is a special instance of our more general ability as perceivers to keep track of how things are. I argue that one upshot of this is that perspectival self‐consciousness, like the ability to perceive more generally, relies on our possession of conce…
A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness
Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. A…
Experience And The Active Mind
What it is like to see
Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds
What it is like to see
Reply to Campbell, Martin, and Kelly
Magic Realism and the Limits of Intelligibility
The Entanglement
Conscious Reference
The world shows up to perceptual consciousness in virtue of the deployment of distinct sensorimotor and also conceptual skills. The availability of the world to thought, is, in contrast, to be explained in connection with the different sorts of skills put to work in thought. I show that thought and experience are varieties of skilful access to the world. The aim of the paper is to present the outlines of a general theory of access
Experience And The Active Mind
Is Perspectival Self-Consciousness Non-Conceptual
As perceivers we are able to keep track of the ways in which our perceptual experience depends on what we do (e.g., on our movements). This capacity, which Hurley calls perspectival self‐consciousness, is a special instance of our more general ability as perceivers to keep track of how things are. I argue that one upshot of this is that perspectival self‐consciousness, like the ability to perceive more generally, relies on our possession of conce…
Strange Tools
Précis of Action In Perception
Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds
A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness
Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. A…
Experience And The Active Mind
What it is like to see
Vision and Mind
The philosophy of perception is a microcosm of the metaphysics of mind. Its central problems—What is perception? What is the nature of perceptual consciousness? How can one fit an account of perceptual experience into a broader account of the nature of the mind and the world?—are at the heart of metaphysics. Rather than try to cover all of the many strands in the philosophy of perception, this book focuses on a particular orthodoxy about the natu…
Is Perspectival Self-Consciousness Non-Conceptual
As perceivers we are able to keep track of the ways in which our perceptual experience depends on what we do (e.g., on our movements). This capacity, which Hurley calls perspectival self‐consciousness, is a special instance of our more general ability as perceivers to keep track of how things are. I argue that one upshot of this is that perspectival self‐consciousness, like the ability to perceive more generally, relies on our possession of conce…
Against intellectualism
Against intellectualism Alva Noë Alva Noë University of CaliforniaBerkeley California 94720-2390, [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 65, Issue 4, October 2005, Pages 278–290, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/65.4.278 Published: 01 October 2005
The Problem with the Picture Picture of Visual Experience
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Magic Realism and the Limits of Intelligibility
Reply to Campbell, Martin, and Kelly
Précis of Action In Perception
Conscious Reference
The world shows up to perceptual consciousness in virtue of the deployment of distinct sensorimotor and also conceptual skills. The availability of the world to thought, is, in contrast, to be explained in connection with the different sorts of skills put to work in thought. I show that thought and experience are varieties of skilful access to the world. The aim of the paper is to present the outlines of a general theory of access
Varieties of Presence
The world shows up for us—it is present in our thought and perception. But, as Alva Noë contends in his latest exploration of the problem of consciousness, it doesn’t show up for free. The world is not simply available; it is achieved rather than given. As with a painting in a gallery, the world has no meaning—no presence to be experienced—apart from our able engagement with it. We must show up, too, and bring along what knowledge and skills we’v…
Strange Tools
Art and Entanglement in Strange Tools
The enactive approach
Entanglement and Ecstasy in Dance, Music, and Philosophy
Dance and music serve in this essay to exemplify both the looping entanglement of art and life as well as the account of art and philosophy developed in Strange Tools. This essay replies to criticisms of Carrie Noland, Nancy S. Struever, and Thomas Rickert and also offers a briefer restatement of the general approach
Death and Entanglement
Learning to Look
Entanglement
The Entanglement
Philosophy (12 works) · Psychology (11 works) · Computer Science (10 works) · Epistemology (10 works) · Cognitive science (8 works) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (7 works) · Library science (6 works) · Perception (6 works) · Art (5 works) · Citation (5 works)