Is Perspectival Self-Consciousness Non-Conceptual
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4769937 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alva Noë (0000-0002-3168-2708, University of California, Santa Cruz, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 52 |
| Issue | 207 |
| Pages | 185-194 |
| Publication date | 2002-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9213.00261 |
| OpenAlex | W2075331908 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 13 |
As perceivers we are able to keep track of the ways in which our perceptual experience depends on what we do (e.g., on our movements). This capacity, which Hurley calls perspectival self‐consciousness, is a special instance of our more general ability as perceivers to keep track of how things are. I argue that one upshot of this is that perspectival self‐consciousness, like the ability to perceive more generally, relies on our possession of conceptual skills
Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Epistemology · Linguistics · Perception · Possession (linguistics) · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Neuroscience · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Plant and Biological Electrophysiology Studies · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,12 |
| Citation span | 2001 - 2008 (8) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |