Christine Tappolet
Biographic Data
| ID | 461489 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Christine Tappolet |
| GIVEN NAMES | Christine |
| FAMILY NAME | Tappolet |
| SIGNATURE | TAPPOLET C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Université de Montréal |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 21 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 20 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 20 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Valuings as Sentiments
We are valuing beings, beings who possess the capacity to value things. But what is it “to value” something? The most common accounts in the literature hold that to value an item is either to have a first‐order or a second‐order desire toward it; or to believe that item to be valuable; or to care about that item; or to have a combination of all these mental states. In our paper, we raise some objections against all these accounts and defend a new…
The Receptive Theory: A New Theory of Emotions
Cognitive Theories of emotions have enjoyed great popularity in recent times. Allegedly, the so-called Perceptual Theory constitutes the most attractive version of this approach. However, the Perceptual Theory has come under increasing pressure. There are at least two ways to deal with the barrage of objections, which have been mounted against the Perceptual Theory. One is to argue that the objections work only if one assumes an overly narrow con…
Philosophy of Emotion: A Contemporary Introduction
In this book, Christine Tappolet offers readers a thorough, wide-ranging, and highly accessible introduction to the philosophy of emotions. It covers recent interdisciplinary debates on the nature of emotions as well as standard theories of emotions, such as feeling theories, motivational theories, and evaluative theories. The book includes discussions of the alleged irrationality of emotions, and looks into the question of whether emotions could…
The rise of affectivism
Shadows of the Soul: Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions
International audience
Replies
Précis of Emotions, Values, and Agency
Emotions, Values, and Agency
The emotions we experience are crucial to who we are, to what we think, and to what we do. But what are emotions, exactly, and how do they relate to agency? The aim of this book is to spell out an account of emotions, which is grounded on analogies between emotions and sensory experiences, and to explore the implications of this account for our understanding of human agency. The central claim is that emotions consist in perceptual experiences of …
Virtue, Happiness, and Well-Being
What is the relation between virtue and well-being? Our claim is that, under certain conditions, virtue necessarily tends to have a positive impact on an individual’s well-being. This is so because of the connection between virtue and psychological happiness, on the one hand, and between psychological happiness and well-being, on the other hand. In particular we defend three claims: that virtue is constituted by a disposition to experience fittin…
The Normativity of Evaluative Concepts
Evaluative vs. Deontic Concepts
Ethical thought is articulated around normative concepts ( see normativity ). Standard examples of normative concepts are good , reason , right , ought , and obligatory . Theorists often treat the normative as an undifferentiated domain. Even so, it is common to distinguish between two kinds of normative concepts: evaluative or axiological concepts (from the Latin valores or the Greek axios , both meaning that which has worth), such as good , and…
Valeurs et émotions, les perspectives du néo-sentimentalisme
Neo-sentimentalism is the view that to judge that something has an evaluative property is to judge that some affective or emotional response is appropriate to it, but this view allows for radically different versions. My aim is to spell out what I take to be its most plausible version. Against its normative version, I argue that its descriptive version can best satisfy the normativity requirement that follows from Moore’s Open Question Argument w…
The Philosophy of Normativity, or How to Try Clearing Things Up a Little
The philosophy of normativity or how to try clearing things up a little
La philosophie de la normativité ou comment tenter de faire un peu d’ordre
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Desires and Practical Judgments in Action: Sergio Tenenbaum's Scholastic View
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Through Thick and Thin: Good and Its Determinates
What is the relation between the concept good and more specific or ‘thick’ concepts such as admirable or courageous? I argue that good or more precisely good pro tanto is a general concept, but that the relation between good pro tanto and the more specific concepts is not that of a genus to its species. The relation of an important class of specific evaluative concepts, which I call ‘affective concepts’, to good pro tanto is better understood as …
Faiblesse de la raison ou faiblesse de volonté: Peut-on choisir
Si l'homme est un être doté de raison et se distingue des autres animaux par sa capacité à réfléchir sur ses actes tant avant de les poser qu'après, il lui arrive cependant d'être irrationnel. Tandis que certains s'en désolent, considérant les différentes formes d'irrationalité comme autant d'expressions de notre inaptitude à atteindre la sagesse, d'autres semblent plutôt s'en réjouir, estimant que la possibilité de ne pas se conformer à ce que d…
Le droit au suicide assisté et à l'euthanasie: Une Question De Respect De l'Autonomie
Tappolet Christine. Le droit au suicide assisté et à l'euthanasie: une question de respect de l'autonomie?. In: Revue Philosophique de Louvain. Quatrième série, tome 101, n°1, 2003. pp. 43-57
Émotions et valeurs
Cette édition numérique a été réalisée à partir d’un support physique, parfois ancien, conservé au sein du dépôt légal de la Bibliothèque nationale de France, conformément à la loi n° 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l’exploitation des Livres indisponibles du XXe siècle.
Truth Pluralism and Many-valued Logics: A Reply to Beall
Mixed inferences are a problem for truth pluralism, a doctrine which aims at combining truth assessability and anti‐realism with respect to allegedly non‐descriptive sentences, such as moral sentences. It seems that truth pluralists have to give up the classical account of validity. Against this,JC Beall suggests that truth pluralists can adopt the account of validity usedin many‐valued logics: validity can be defined as the conservation of desig…
À la rescousse du platonisme moral
Moral platonism, the claim that moral entities are both objective and prescriptive, is generally thought to be a dead end. In an attempt to defend a moderate form of moral platonism or more precisely platonism about values, I first argue that several of the many versions of this doctrine are not committed to ontological extravagances. I then discuss an important objection due to John McDowell and developed by Michael Smith, according to which mor…
Through Thick and Thin: Good and Its Determinates
What is the relation between the concept good and more specific or ‘thick’ concepts such as admirable or courageous? I argue that good or more precisely good pro tanto is a general concept, but that the relation between good pro tanto and the more specific concepts is not that of a genus to its species. The relation of an important class of specific evaluative concepts, which I call ‘affective concepts’, to good pro tanto is better understood as …
The rise of affectivism
Virtue, Happiness, and Well-Being
What is the relation between virtue and well-being? Our claim is that, under certain conditions, virtue necessarily tends to have a positive impact on an individual’s well-being. This is so because of the connection between virtue and psychological happiness, on the one hand, and between psychological happiness and well-being, on the other hand. In particular we defend three claims: that virtue is constituted by a disposition to experience fittin…
Desires and Practical Judgments in Action: Sergio Tenenbaum's Scholastic View
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Le droit au suicide assisté et à l'euthanasie: Une Question De Respect De l'Autonomie
Tappolet Christine. Le droit au suicide assisté et à l'euthanasie: une question de respect de l'autonomie?. In: Revue Philosophique de Louvain. Quatrième série, tome 101, n°1, 2003. pp. 43-57
Émotions et valeurs
Cette édition numérique a été réalisée à partir d’un support physique, parfois ancien, conservé au sein du dépôt légal de la Bibliothèque nationale de France, conformément à la loi n° 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l’exploitation des Livres indisponibles du XXe siècle.
Truth Pluralism and Many-valued Logics: A Reply to Beall
Mixed inferences are a problem for truth pluralism, a doctrine which aims at combining truth assessability and anti‐realism with respect to allegedly non‐descriptive sentences, such as moral sentences. It seems that truth pluralists have to give up the classical account of validity. Against this,JC Beall suggests that truth pluralists can adopt the account of validity usedin many‐valued logics: validity can be defined as the conservation of desig…
À la rescousse du platonisme moral
Moral platonism, the claim that moral entities are both objective and prescriptive, is generally thought to be a dead end. In an attempt to defend a moderate form of moral platonism or more precisely platonism about values, I first argue that several of the many versions of this doctrine are not committed to ontological extravagances. I then discuss an important objection due to John McDowell and developed by Michael Smith, according to which mor…
Faiblesse de la raison ou faiblesse de volonté: Peut-on choisir
Si l'homme est un être doté de raison et se distingue des autres animaux par sa capacité à réfléchir sur ses actes tant avant de les poser qu'après, il lui arrive cependant d'être irrationnel. Tandis que certains s'en désolent, considérant les différentes formes d'irrationalité comme autant d'expressions de notre inaptitude à atteindre la sagesse, d'autres semblent plutôt s'en réjouir, estimant que la possibilité de ne pas se conformer à ce que d…
Le droit au suicide assisté et à l'euthanasie: Une Question De Respect De l'Autonomie
Tappolet Christine. Le droit au suicide assisté et à l'euthanasie: une question de respect de l'autonomie?. In: Revue Philosophique de Louvain. Quatrième série, tome 101, n°1, 2003. pp. 43-57
Through Thick and Thin: Good and Its Determinates
What is the relation between the concept good and more specific or ‘thick’ concepts such as admirable or courageous? I argue that good or more precisely good pro tanto is a general concept, but that the relation between good pro tanto and the more specific concepts is not that of a genus to its species. The relation of an important class of specific evaluative concepts, which I call ‘affective concepts’, to good pro tanto is better understood as …
Desires and Practical Judgments in Action: Sergio Tenenbaum's Scholastic View
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
The Philosophy of Normativity, or How to Try Clearing Things Up a Little
The philosophy of normativity or how to try clearing things up a little
La philosophie de la normativité ou comment tenter de faire un peu d’ordre
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Valeurs et émotions, les perspectives du néo-sentimentalisme
Neo-sentimentalism is the view that to judge that something has an evaluative property is to judge that some affective or emotional response is appropriate to it, but this view allows for radically different versions. My aim is to spell out what I take to be its most plausible version. Against its normative version, I argue that its descriptive version can best satisfy the normativity requirement that follows from Moore’s Open Question Argument w…
Evaluative vs. Deontic Concepts
Ethical thought is articulated around normative concepts ( see normativity ). Standard examples of normative concepts are good , reason , right , ought , and obligatory . Theorists often treat the normative as an undifferentiated domain. Even so, it is common to distinguish between two kinds of normative concepts: evaluative or axiological concepts (from the Latin valores or the Greek axios , both meaning that which has worth), such as good , and…
The Normativity of Evaluative Concepts
Emotions, Values, and Agency
The emotions we experience are crucial to who we are, to what we think, and to what we do. But what are emotions, exactly, and how do they relate to agency? The aim of this book is to spell out an account of emotions, which is grounded on analogies between emotions and sensory experiences, and to explore the implications of this account for our understanding of human agency. The central claim is that emotions consist in perceptual experiences of …
Virtue, Happiness, and Well-Being
What is the relation between virtue and well-being? Our claim is that, under certain conditions, virtue necessarily tends to have a positive impact on an individual’s well-being. This is so because of the connection between virtue and psychological happiness, on the one hand, and between psychological happiness and well-being, on the other hand. In particular we defend three claims: that virtue is constituted by a disposition to experience fittin…
Shadows of the Soul: Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions
International audience
Replies
Précis of Emotions, Values, and Agency
The rise of affectivism
Philosophy of Emotion: A Contemporary Introduction
In this book, Christine Tappolet offers readers a thorough, wide-ranging, and highly accessible introduction to the philosophy of emotions. It covers recent interdisciplinary debates on the nature of emotions as well as standard theories of emotions, such as feeling theories, motivational theories, and evaluative theories. The book includes discussions of the alleged irrationality of emotions, and looks into the question of whether emotions could…
The Receptive Theory: A New Theory of Emotions
Cognitive Theories of emotions have enjoyed great popularity in recent times. Allegedly, the so-called Perceptual Theory constitutes the most attractive version of this approach. However, the Perceptual Theory has come under increasing pressure. There are at least two ways to deal with the barrage of objections, which have been mounted against the Perceptual Theory. One is to argue that the objections work only if one assumes an overly narrow con…
Valuings as Sentiments
We are valuing beings, beings who possess the capacity to value things. But what is it “to value” something? The most common accounts in the literature hold that to value an item is either to have a first‐order or a second‐order desire toward it; or to believe that item to be valuable; or to care about that item; or to have a combination of all these mental states. In our paper, we raise some objections against all these accounts and defend a new…
Philosophy (13 works) · Epistemology (12 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (9 works) · Psychology (9 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (8 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Free Will and Agency (4 works) · Humanities (4 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (4 works) · Sociology (4 works)