À la rescousse du platonisme moral
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9687174 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christine Tappolet (Université de Montréal, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2000 |
| Volume | 39 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 531-556 |
| Publication date | 2000-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s001221730000754x |
| OpenAlex | W2073218254 |
| Language | FR |
| References cited | 28 |
Moral platonism, the claim that moral entities are both objective and prescriptive, is generally thought to be a dead end. In an attempt to defend a moderate form of moral platonism or more precisely platonism about values, I first argue that several of the many versions of this doctrine are not committed to ontological extravagances. I then discuss an important objection due to John McDowell and developed by Michael Smith, according to which moral platonism is incoherent. I argue that objectivism is compatible with the claim that certain ways of being aware of values, namely those involving emotions, are motivating
Doctrine · Epistemology · Internalism and externalism · Objectivism · Platonism · Theology · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Ethics
The Rationality of Emotion
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics
Émotions et valeurs
Ii—the Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
An Essay concerning Human Understanding
I. Deontic Logic
Whatever happened to Deontic Logic?
The Universalizability of Moral Judgements
Contractualism and utilitarianism
Moral Relativism Defended
Our Knowledge of Fact and Value
Moral Realism
On the Epistemic Value of Moral Experience
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings
Our Knowledge of Fact and Value
Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |