Andrea Iacona
Biographic Data
| ID | 462188 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andrea Iacona |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andrea |
| FAMILY NAME | Iacona |
| SIGNATURE | IACONA A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Turin |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0935-0229 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 17 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Future Actuality and Truth Ascriptions
One question that arises in connection with Ockhamism, and that perhaps has not yet received the attention it deserves, is how a coherent formal account of truth ascriptions can be provided by using a suitable truth predicate in the object language. We address this question and show its implications for some semantic issues that have been discussed in the literature on future contingents. Arguably, understanding how truth ascriptions work at the …
Conditionals
According to the view of conditionals named inferentialism , a conditional holds when its consequent can be inferred from its antecedent. This paper identifies some major challenges that inferentialism has to face, and uses them to assess three accounts of conditionals: one is the classical strict account, the other two have recently been proposed by Douven and Rott. As will be shown, none of the three proposals meets all challenges in a fully sa…
Alethic Pluralism and Kripkean Truth in advance
According to alethic pluralism, there are different ways of being true, that is, there is a plurality of truth properties, each of which pertains to a specific domain of discourse. This paper shows how such a plurality can be represented in a coherent formal framework by means of a Kripke-style construction that yields intuitively correct extensions for distinct truth predicates. The theory of truth we develop can handle at least three crucial pr…
Quantitative supervaluationism
So far, the method of supervaluations has been mainly employed to define a non-gradable property of sentences, supertruth, in order to provide an analysis of truth. But it is also possible, and arguably at least as plausible, to define a gradable property of sentences along the same lines. This paper presents a supervaluationist semantics that is quantitative rather than qualitative. As will be shown, there are at least two distinct interpretatio…
Vagueness and relative truth
According to a view called 'nihilism', sentences containing vague expressions cannot strictly speaking be true or false, because they lack definite truth conditions. While most theorists of vagueness tend to regard nihilism as a hopeless view, a few isolated attempts have been made to defend it. This paper aims to develop such attempts in a new direction by showing how nihilism, once properly spelled out, can meet three crucial explanatory challe…
The Evidential Conditional
This paper outlines an account of conditionals, the evidential account , which rests on the idea that a conditional is true just in case its antecedent supports its consequent. As we will show, the evidential account exhibits some distinctive logical features that deserve careful consideration. On the one hand, it departs from the material reading of ‘if then’ exactly in the way we would like it to depart from that reading. On the other, it signi…
Knowledge of future contingents
This paper addresses the question whether future contingents are knowable, that is, whether one can know that things will go a certain way even though it is possible that things will not go that way. First I will consider a long-established view that implies a negative answer, and draw attention to some endemic problems that affect its credibility. Then I will sketch an alternative line of thought that prompts a positive answer: future contingent…
Outline of a Theory of Reasons
This paper investigates the logic of reasons. Its aim is to provide an analysis of the sentences of the form ‘p is a reason for q’ that yields a coherent account of their logical properties. The idea that we will develop is that ‘p is a reason for q’ is acceptable just in case a suitably defined relation of incompatibility obtains between p and ¬q. As we will suggest, a theory of reasons based on this idea can solve three challenging puzzles that…
Love, Reasons, and Replaceability
Lovers typically entertain two sorts of thoughts about their beloveds. On the one hand, they think that the qualities of their beloveds provide reasons for loving them. On the other, they regard their beloveds as irreplaceable. Yet it may be asked how these two sorts of thoughts can coherently coexist. If Romeo loves Juliet in virtue of her qualities, shouldn’t another maiden with the same qualities be equally lovable for him? This paper draws so…
Credible Futures
This paper articulates in formal terms a crucial distinction concerning future contingents, the distinction between what is true about the future and what is reasonable to believe about the future. Its key idea is that the branching structures that have been used so far to model truth can be employed to define an epistemic property, credibility , which we take to be closely related to knowledge and assertibility, and which is ultimately reducible…
On the Puzzle of the Changing Past
Ockhamism without Thin Red Lines
Future Contingents and Aristotle’s Fantasy
This paper deals with the problem of future contingents, and focuses on two classical logical principles, excluded middle and bivalence. One may think that different attitudes are to be adopted towards these two principles in order to solve the problem. According to what seems to be a widely held hypothesis, excluded middle must be accepted while bivalence must be rejected. The paper goes against that line of thought. In the first place, it shows…
Petitio Principii
Petitio Principii
Rethinking Bivalence
Propositions
Ockhamism without Thin Red Lines
Vagueness and relative truth
According to a view called 'nihilism', sentences containing vague expressions cannot strictly speaking be true or false, because they lack definite truth conditions. While most theorists of vagueness tend to regard nihilism as a hopeless view, a few isolated attempts have been made to defend it. This paper aims to develop such attempts in a new direction by showing how nihilism, once properly spelled out, can meet three crucial explanatory challe…
Credible Futures
This paper articulates in formal terms a crucial distinction concerning future contingents, the distinction between what is true about the future and what is reasonable to believe about the future. Its key idea is that the branching structures that have been used so far to model truth can be employed to define an epistemic property, credibility , which we take to be closely related to knowledge and assertibility, and which is ultimately reducible…
Propositions
Petitio Principii
Petitio Principii
Rethinking Bivalence
Future Contingents and Aristotle’s Fantasy
This paper deals with the problem of future contingents, and focuses on two classical logical principles, excluded middle and bivalence. One may think that different attitudes are to be adopted towards these two principles in order to solve the problem. According to what seems to be a widely held hypothesis, excluded middle must be accepted while bivalence must be rejected. The paper goes against that line of thought. In the first place, it shows…
Ockhamism without Thin Red Lines
On the Puzzle of the Changing Past
Love, Reasons, and Replaceability
Lovers typically entertain two sorts of thoughts about their beloveds. On the one hand, they think that the qualities of their beloveds provide reasons for loving them. On the other, they regard their beloveds as irreplaceable. Yet it may be asked how these two sorts of thoughts can coherently coexist. If Romeo loves Juliet in virtue of her qualities, shouldn’t another maiden with the same qualities be equally lovable for him? This paper draws so…
Credible Futures
This paper articulates in formal terms a crucial distinction concerning future contingents, the distinction between what is true about the future and what is reasonable to believe about the future. Its key idea is that the branching structures that have been used so far to model truth can be employed to define an epistemic property, credibility , which we take to be closely related to knowledge and assertibility, and which is ultimately reducible…
The Evidential Conditional
This paper outlines an account of conditionals, the evidential account , which rests on the idea that a conditional is true just in case its antecedent supports its consequent. As we will show, the evidential account exhibits some distinctive logical features that deserve careful consideration. On the one hand, it departs from the material reading of ‘if then’ exactly in the way we would like it to depart from that reading. On the other, it signi…
Knowledge of future contingents
This paper addresses the question whether future contingents are knowable, that is, whether one can know that things will go a certain way even though it is possible that things will not go that way. First I will consider a long-established view that implies a negative answer, and draw attention to some endemic problems that affect its credibility. Then I will sketch an alternative line of thought that prompts a positive answer: future contingent…
Outline of a Theory of Reasons
This paper investigates the logic of reasons. Its aim is to provide an analysis of the sentences of the form ‘p is a reason for q’ that yields a coherent account of their logical properties. The idea that we will develop is that ‘p is a reason for q’ is acceptable just in case a suitably defined relation of incompatibility obtains between p and ¬q. As we will suggest, a theory of reasons based on this idea can solve three challenging puzzles that…
Future Actuality and Truth Ascriptions
One question that arises in connection with Ockhamism, and that perhaps has not yet received the attention it deserves, is how a coherent formal account of truth ascriptions can be provided by using a suitable truth predicate in the object language. We address this question and show its implications for some semantic issues that have been discussed in the literature on future contingents. Arguably, understanding how truth ascriptions work at the …
Conditionals
According to the view of conditionals named inferentialism , a conditional holds when its consequent can be inferred from its antecedent. This paper identifies some major challenges that inferentialism has to face, and uses them to assess three accounts of conditionals: one is the classical strict account, the other two have recently been proposed by Douven and Rott. As will be shown, none of the three proposals meets all challenges in a fully sa…
Alethic Pluralism and Kripkean Truth in advance
According to alethic pluralism, there are different ways of being true, that is, there is a plurality of truth properties, each of which pertains to a specific domain of discourse. This paper shows how such a plurality can be represented in a coherent formal framework by means of a Kripke-style construction that yields intuitively correct extensions for distinct truth predicates. The theory of truth we develop can handle at least three crucial pr…
Quantitative supervaluationism
So far, the method of supervaluations has been mainly employed to define a non-gradable property of sentences, supertruth, in order to provide an analysis of truth. But it is also possible, and arguably at least as plausible, to define a gradable property of sentences along the same lines. This paper presents a supervaluationist semantics that is quantitative rather than qualitative. As will be shown, there are at least two distinct interpretatio…
Vagueness and relative truth
According to a view called 'nihilism', sentences containing vague expressions cannot strictly speaking be true or false, because they lack definite truth conditions. While most theorists of vagueness tend to regard nihilism as a hopeless view, a few isolated attempts have been made to defend it. This paper aims to develop such attempts in a new direction by showing how nihilism, once properly spelled out, can meet three crucial explanatory challe…
Philosophy (15 works) · Epistemology (14 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Psychology (7 works) · Metaphysics (6 works) · Philosophy of language (6 works) · Philosophy of science (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Linguistics (4 works)