Vagueness and relative truth
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4797549 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrea Iacona (0000-0003-0935-0229, University of Turin, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 75 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 939-955 |
| Publication date | 2025-06-12 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqae060 |
| OpenAlex | W4399352492 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 16 |
According to a view called 'nihilism', sentences containing vague expressions cannot strictly speaking be true or false, because they lack definite truth conditions. While most theorists of vagueness tend to regard nihilism as a hopeless view, a few isolated attempts have been made to defend it. This paper aims to develop such attempts in a new direction by showing how nihilism, once properly spelled out, can meet three crucial explanatory challenges that, respectively, concern truth, assertibility, and communication
Epistemology · Linguistics · Nihilism · Psychoanalysis · Truth telling · Vagueness · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |