Nick Schuster
Biographic Data
| ID | 4631765 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nick Schuster |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nick |
| FAMILY NAME | Schuster |
| SIGNATURE | SCHUSTER N |
| AFFILIATIONS | Australian National University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5351-3745 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Moral disagreement and the limits of AI value alignment: A dual challenge of epistemic justification and political legitimacy
AI systems are increasingly in a position to have deep and systemic impacts on human wellbeing. Projects in value alignment, a critical area of AI safety research, must ultimately aim to ensure that all those who stand to be affected by such systems have good reason to accept their outputs. This is especially challenging where AI systems are involved in making morally controversial decisions. In this paper, we consider three current approaches to…
Attention, moral skill, and algorithmic recommendation
Recommender systems are artificial intelligence technologies, deployed by online platforms, that model our individual preferences and direct our attention to content we’re likely to engage with. As the digital world has become increasingly saturated with information, we’ve become ever more reliant on these tools to efficiently allocate our attention. And our reliance on algorithmic recommendation may, in turn, reshape us as moral agents. While re…
The Skill Model: A Dilemma for Virtue Ethics
According to agent-centered virtue ethics, acting well is not a matter of conforming to agent-independent moral standards, like acting so as to respect humanity or maximize utility. Instead, virtuous agents determine what is called for in their circumstances through good practical reason. This is an attractive view, but it requires a plausible account of how good practical reason works. To that end, some theorists invoke the skill model of virtue…
Complex Harmony: Rethinking the Virtue-Continence Distinction
Attention, moral skill, and algorithmic recommendation
Recommender systems are artificial intelligence technologies, deployed by online platforms, that model our individual preferences and direct our attention to content we’re likely to engage with. As the digital world has become increasingly saturated with information, we’ve become ever more reliant on these tools to efficiently allocate our attention. And our reliance on algorithmic recommendation may, in turn, reshape us as moral agents. While re…
Complex Harmony: Rethinking the Virtue-Continence Distinction
The Skill Model: A Dilemma for Virtue Ethics
According to agent-centered virtue ethics, acting well is not a matter of conforming to agent-independent moral standards, like acting so as to respect humanity or maximize utility. Instead, virtuous agents determine what is called for in their circumstances through good practical reason. This is an attractive view, but it requires a plausible account of how good practical reason works. To that end, some theorists invoke the skill model of virtue…
Moral disagreement and the limits of AI value alignment: A dual challenge of epistemic justification and political legitimacy
AI systems are increasingly in a position to have deep and systemic impacts on human wellbeing. Projects in value alignment, a critical area of AI safety research, must ultimately aim to ensure that all those who stand to be affected by such systems have good reason to accept their outputs. This is especially challenging where AI systems are involved in making morally controversial decisions. In this paper, we consider three current approaches to…
Attention, moral skill, and algorithmic recommendation
Recommender systems are artificial intelligence technologies, deployed by online platforms, that model our individual preferences and direct our attention to content we’re likely to engage with. As the digital world has become increasingly saturated with information, we’ve become ever more reliant on these tools to efficiently allocate our attention. And our reliance on algorithmic recommendation may, in turn, reshape us as moral agents. While re…
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Moral agency (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Political science (2 works)