The Skill Model

A Dilemma for Virtue Ethics

Bibliographic Data

ID21702006
AuthorsNick Schuster (0000-0002-5351-3745, Australian National University, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume26
Issue3
Pages447-461
Publication date2023-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEthical Theory and Moral Practice (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1386-2820 • E-ISSN: 1572-8447
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10677-023-10380-6
OpenAlexW4327573671
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited35

According to agent-centered virtue ethics, acting well is not a matter of conforming to agent-independent moral standards, like acting so as to respect humanity or maximize utility. Instead, virtuous agents determine what is called for in their circumstances through good practical reason. This is an attractive view, but it requires a plausible account of how good practical reason works. To that end, some theorists invoke the skill model of virtue, according to which virtue involves essentially the same kind of practical reason as ordinary skills. I contend, however, that ordinary skills provide a plausible and informative model of good practical reason only insofar as they are assessed by agent-independent standards. And so virtue, likewise, must be assessed primarily by agent-independent moral standards, if the skill model is to serve its purpose. I consider how agent-centered virtue ethics might avert this dilemma. But I ultimately suggest proceeding a different way

Dilemma · Epistemic virtue · Epistemology · Humanity · Philosophy of medicine · Political science · Practical reason · Virtue · Virtue ethics · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

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