Luke Roelofs
Biographic Data
| ID | 486613 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Luke Roelofs |
| GIVEN NAMES | Luke |
| FAMILY NAME | Roelofs |
| SIGNATURE | ROELOFS L |
| AFFILIATIONS | New York University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2424-8583 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Simulation trouble and gender trouble
Is it impossible to imaginatively simulate what it’s like to be someone with a different gender experience – to understand them empathically? Or is it simply difficult, a challenge requiring effort and dedication? I first distinguish three different sorts of obstacle to empathic understanding that are sometimes discussed: Missing Ingredient problems, Awkward Combination Problems, and Inappropriate Background Problems. I then argue that, although …
Overlapping minds and the hedonic calculus
It may soon be possible for neurotechnology to connect two subjects' brains such that they share a single token mental state, such as a feeling of pleasure or displeasure. How will our moral frameworks have to adapt to accommodate this prospect? And if this sort of mental-state-sharing might already obtain in some cases, how should this possibility impact our moral thinking? This question turns out to be extremely challenging, because different e…
No Such Thing as Too Many Minds
Many philosophical views have the surprising implication that, within the boundaries of each human being, there is not just one mind, but many: anywhere from two (the person and their brain, or the person and their body) to trillions (each of the nearly-entirely-overlapping precise entities generated by the Problem of the Many). This is often treated as absurd, a problem of ‘Too Many Minds’, which we must find ways to avoid. It is often thought s…
Sentientism, Motivation, and Philosophical Vulcans
If moral status depends on the capacity for consciousness, what kind of consciousness matters exactly? Two popular answers are that any kind of consciousness matters (Broad Sentientism), and that what matters is the capacity for pleasure and suffering (Narrow Sentientism). I argue that the broad answer is too broad, while the narrow answer is likely too narrow, as Chalmers has recently argued by appeal to ‘philosophical Vulcans’. I defend a middl…
Longings in Limbo: A New Defence of I-Desires
Consciousness, Revelation, and Confusion
Critics have charged constitutive panpsychism with inconsistency.Panpsychists reject physicalism for its seeming inability to explainconsciousness. In making this argument, they commit themselves tothe idea of "revelation": that we know, in some especially direct way,the nature of consciousness. Yet they then attribute properties to ourconsciousness---like being constituted out of trillions of simplerexperiential parts---that conflict with how it…
Implicit Coordination: Acting Quasi-Jointly on Implicit Shared Intentions
We identify a social phenomenon in which large numbers of people seem to work towards a shared goal without explicitly trying to do so. We argue that this phenomenon - implicit coordination - is best understood as a form of joint agency differing from the forms most commonly discussed in the literature in the same way that individual actions driven by "explicit" intentions (those available for reflection and report) differ from individual actions…
Implicit Coordination: Acting Quasi-Jointly on Implicit Shared Intentions
We identify a social phenomenon in which large numbers of people seem to work towards a shared goal without explicitly trying to do so. We argue that this phenomenon - implicit coordination - is best understood as a form of joint agency differing from the forms most commonly discussed in the literature in the same way that individual actions driven by "explicit" intentions (those available for reflection and report) differ from individual actions…
Implicit Coordination: Acting Quasi-Jointly on Implicit Shared Intentions
We identify a social phenomenon in which large numbers of people seem to work towards a shared goal without explicitly trying to do so. We argue that this phenomenon - implicit coordination - is best understood as a form of joint agency differing from the forms most commonly discussed in the literature in the same way that individual actions driven by "explicit" intentions (those available for reflection and report) differ from individual actions…
Consciousness, Revelation, and Confusion
Critics have charged constitutive panpsychism with inconsistency.Panpsychists reject physicalism for its seeming inability to explainconsciousness. In making this argument, they commit themselves tothe idea of "revelation": that we know, in some especially direct way,the nature of consciousness. Yet they then attribute properties to ourconsciousness---like being constituted out of trillions of simplerexperiential parts---that conflict with how it…
Sentientism, Motivation, and Philosophical Vulcans
If moral status depends on the capacity for consciousness, what kind of consciousness matters exactly? Two popular answers are that any kind of consciousness matters (Broad Sentientism), and that what matters is the capacity for pleasure and suffering (Narrow Sentientism). I argue that the broad answer is too broad, while the narrow answer is likely too narrow, as Chalmers has recently argued by appeal to ‘philosophical Vulcans’. I defend a middl…
Longings in Limbo: A New Defence of I-Desires
Simulation trouble and gender trouble
Is it impossible to imaginatively simulate what it’s like to be someone with a different gender experience – to understand them empathically? Or is it simply difficult, a challenge requiring effort and dedication? I first distinguish three different sorts of obstacle to empathic understanding that are sometimes discussed: Missing Ingredient problems, Awkward Combination Problems, and Inappropriate Background Problems. I then argue that, although …
Overlapping minds and the hedonic calculus
It may soon be possible for neurotechnology to connect two subjects' brains such that they share a single token mental state, such as a feeling of pleasure or displeasure. How will our moral frameworks have to adapt to accommodate this prospect? And if this sort of mental-state-sharing might already obtain in some cases, how should this possibility impact our moral thinking? This question turns out to be extremely challenging, because different e…
No Such Thing as Too Many Minds
Many philosophical views have the surprising implication that, within the boundaries of each human being, there is not just one mind, but many: anywhere from two (the person and their brain, or the person and their body) to trillions (each of the nearly-entirely-overlapping precise entities generated by the Problem of the Many). This is often treated as absurd, a problem of ‘Too Many Minds’, which we must find ways to avoid. It is often thought s…
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Cognitive psychology (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Consciousness (2 works)