Implicit Coordination

Acting Quasi-Jointly on Implicit Shared Intentions

Bibliographic Data

ID3063046
AuthorsJudith Martens (0000-0001-9219-7805, Ruhr University Bochum), Luke Roelofs (0000-0002-2424-8583, Ruhr University Bochum, corresponding author)
Year2018
Volume4
Issue2
Pages93-120
Publication date2018-12-19
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Social Ontology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2196-9663 • E-ISSN: 2196-9655
PublisherWalter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1515/jso-2018-0018
OpenAlexW2934969030
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited53

We identify a social phenomenon in which large numbers of people seem to work towards a shared goal without explicitly trying to do so. We argue that this phenomenon - implicit coordination - is best understood as a form of joint agency differing from the forms most commonly discussed in the literature in the same way that individual actions driven by "explicit" intentions (those available for reflection and report) differ from individual actions driven by "implicit" intentions (those not thus available). More precisely, implicit coordination is both analogous to wholly implicit individual intentions, and constituted by the partly implicit intentions of participants. We discuss the significance of this category for action theory, social ontology, and social criticism

Action (physics · Agency (philosophy · Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Phenomenon · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

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