Fabrice Teroni
Biographic Data
| ID | 487063 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Fabrice Teroni |
| GIVEN NAMES | Fabrice |
| FAMILY NAME | Teroni |
| SIGNATURE | TERONI F |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Geneva |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6532-4258 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 17 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 14 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The creativity of emotions
In this paper, we explore the links between emotions and creativity. Building on what we perceive as key examples, we distinguish instrumental and constitutive senses in which emotions can be creative. Emotions are instrumentally creative when they sustain novel and valuable thought processes aiming at maintaining or modifying a given emotional situation. They are constitutively creative when they function as essential parts of value understandin…
Why are emotions epistemically indispensable
Contemporary philosophers are attracted by the Indispensability Claim, according to which emotions are indispensable in acquiring knowledge of some important values. The truth of this claim is often thought to depend on that of Emotional Dogmatism, the view that emotions justify evaluative judgements because they (seem to) make us aware of the relevant values. The aim of this paper is to show that the Indispensability Claim does not stand or fall…
Emotions and Their Correctness Conditions: A Defense of Attitudinalism
In this paper, we contrast the different ways in which the representationalist and the attitudinalist in the theory of emotions account for the fact that emotions have evaluative correctness conditions. We argue that the attitudinalist has the resources to defend her view against recent attacks from the representationalist. To this end, we elaborate on the idea that emotional attitudes have a rich profile and explain how it supports the claim tha…
Evaluative theories in psychology and philosophy of emotion
In contemporary psychology and philosophy, influential theories approach the emotions via their relations to values and evaluations. My aim is to contribute to our understanding of how these evaluative theories in psychology and philosophy relate to one another. I first explain why this presupposes that we make up our minds about the relations between “molecular” and “molar” properties. The rest of my discussion explores some ways of understandin…
Which Attitudes for the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value
According to the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value concepts, to conceive of an object as having a given value is to conceive of it as being such that a certain evaluative attitude taken towards it would be fitting. Among the challenges that this analysis has to face, two are especially pressing. The first is a psychological challenge: the FA analysis must call upon attitudes that shed light on our value concepts while not presupposing the m…
The rise of affectivism
Emotion, Fiction and Rationality
Journal Article Emotion, Fiction and Rationality Get access Fabrice Teroni Fabrice Teroni University of Geneva [email protected] https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6532-4258 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 59, Issue 2, April 2019, Pages 113–128, https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayz015 Published: 10 May 2019
Shadows of the Soul: Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions
International audience
The Emotions
The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In…
From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements
Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of th…
L’intentionnalité des émotions: Du Corps Aux Valeurs
Lorsque l’on considère les émotions indépendamment de toute entreprise théorique, deux constats s’imposent. D’un côté, les émotions possèdent une dimension phénoménale ou expérientielle : il y a un « effet que cela fait » que de ressentir une émotion, et cet effet se manifeste de manière particulièrement saillante dans la conscience des perturbations physiologiques propre aux expériences émotionnelles fortes. De l’autre, les émotions nous mettent…
Taking affective explanations to heart
In this article, the authors examine and debate the categories of emotions, moods, temperaments, character traits and sentiments. They define them and offer an account of the relations that exist among the phenomena they cover. They argue that, whereas ascribing character traits and sentiments (dispositions) is to ascribe a specific coherence and stability to the emotions (episodes) the subject is likely to feel, ascribing temperaments (dispositi…
Differentiating shame from guilt
Shame's guilt disproved
The contemporary consensus on shame is pessimistic. Three main reasons, all connected with the alleged fact that, in shame, you allow yourself to become the victim of external pressures, appear to motivate this conclusion. First, shame is said to be the emotion of social sanction: when you feel shame, you submit to the judgements of others. Second, shame is supposed to be triggered by the way you look in the eyes of others. Thirdly, and as a resu…
Emotions and Formal Objects
It is often claimed that emotions are linked to formal objects. But what are formal objects? What roles do they play? According to some philosophers, formal objects are axiological properties which individuate emotions, make them intelligible and give their correctness conditions. In this paper, I evaluate these claims in order to answer the above questions. I first give reasons to doubt the thesis that formal objects individuate emotions. Second…
The rise of affectivism
Emotion, Fiction and Rationality
Journal Article Emotion, Fiction and Rationality Get access Fabrice Teroni Fabrice Teroni University of Geneva [email protected] https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6532-4258 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 59, Issue 2, April 2019, Pages 113–128, https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayz015 Published: 10 May 2019
From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements
Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of th…
L’intentionnalité des émotions: Du Corps Aux Valeurs
Lorsque l’on considère les émotions indépendamment de toute entreprise théorique, deux constats s’imposent. D’un côté, les émotions possèdent une dimension phénoménale ou expérientielle : il y a un « effet que cela fait » que de ressentir une émotion, et cet effet se manifeste de manière particulièrement saillante dans la conscience des perturbations physiologiques propre aux expériences émotionnelles fortes. De l’autre, les émotions nous mettent…
Taking affective explanations to heart
In this article, the authors examine and debate the categories of emotions, moods, temperaments, character traits and sentiments. They define them and offer an account of the relations that exist among the phenomena they cover. They argue that, whereas ascribing character traits and sentiments (dispositions) is to ascribe a specific coherence and stability to the emotions (episodes) the subject is likely to feel, ascribing temperaments (dispositi…
Emotions and Formal Objects
It is often claimed that emotions are linked to formal objects. But what are formal objects? What roles do they play? According to some philosophers, formal objects are axiological properties which individuate emotions, make them intelligible and give their correctness conditions. In this paper, I evaluate these claims in order to answer the above questions. I first give reasons to doubt the thesis that formal objects individuate emotions. Second…
Differentiating shame from guilt
Shame's guilt disproved
The contemporary consensus on shame is pessimistic. Three main reasons, all connected with the alleged fact that, in shame, you allow yourself to become the victim of external pressures, appear to motivate this conclusion. First, shame is said to be the emotion of social sanction: when you feel shame, you submit to the judgements of others. Second, shame is supposed to be triggered by the way you look in the eyes of others. Thirdly, and as a resu…
L’intentionnalité des émotions: Du Corps Aux Valeurs
Lorsque l’on considère les émotions indépendamment de toute entreprise théorique, deux constats s’imposent. D’un côté, les émotions possèdent une dimension phénoménale ou expérientielle : il y a un « effet que cela fait » que de ressentir une émotion, et cet effet se manifeste de manière particulièrement saillante dans la conscience des perturbations physiologiques propre aux expériences émotionnelles fortes. De l’autre, les émotions nous mettent…
Taking affective explanations to heart
In this article, the authors examine and debate the categories of emotions, moods, temperaments, character traits and sentiments. They define them and offer an account of the relations that exist among the phenomena they cover. They argue that, whereas ascribing character traits and sentiments (dispositions) is to ascribe a specific coherence and stability to the emotions (episodes) the subject is likely to feel, ascribing temperaments (dispositi…
The Emotions
The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In…
From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements
Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of th…
Shadows of the Soul: Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions
International audience
Emotion, Fiction and Rationality
Journal Article Emotion, Fiction and Rationality Get access Fabrice Teroni Fabrice Teroni University of Geneva [email protected] https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6532-4258 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 59, Issue 2, April 2019, Pages 113–128, https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayz015 Published: 10 May 2019
Which Attitudes for the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value
According to the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value concepts, to conceive of an object as having a given value is to conceive of it as being such that a certain evaluative attitude taken towards it would be fitting. Among the challenges that this analysis has to face, two are especially pressing. The first is a psychological challenge: the FA analysis must call upon attitudes that shed light on our value concepts while not presupposing the m…
The rise of affectivism
Evaluative theories in psychology and philosophy of emotion
In contemporary psychology and philosophy, influential theories approach the emotions via their relations to values and evaluations. My aim is to contribute to our understanding of how these evaluative theories in psychology and philosophy relate to one another. I first explain why this presupposes that we make up our minds about the relations between “molecular” and “molar” properties. The rest of my discussion explores some ways of understandin…
Emotions and Their Correctness Conditions: A Defense of Attitudinalism
In this paper, we contrast the different ways in which the representationalist and the attitudinalist in the theory of emotions account for the fact that emotions have evaluative correctness conditions. We argue that the attitudinalist has the resources to defend her view against recent attacks from the representationalist. To this end, we elaborate on the idea that emotional attitudes have a rich profile and explain how it supports the claim tha…
The creativity of emotions
In this paper, we explore the links between emotions and creativity. Building on what we perceive as key examples, we distinguish instrumental and constitutive senses in which emotions can be creative. Emotions are instrumentally creative when they sustain novel and valuable thought processes aiming at maintaining or modifying a given emotional situation. They are constitutively creative when they function as essential parts of value understandin…
Why are emotions epistemically indispensable
Contemporary philosophers are attracted by the Indispensability Claim, according to which emotions are indispensable in acquiring knowledge of some important values. The truth of this claim is often thought to depend on that of Emotional Dogmatism, the view that emotions justify evaluative judgements because they (seem to) make us aware of the relevant values. The aim of this paper is to show that the Indispensability Claim does not stand or fall…
Psychology (13 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (12 works) · Epistemology (12 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Social Psychology (11 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (9 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Cognitive psychology (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology (2 works)