From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4953537 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Julien A Deonna, Julien Deonna (0000-0003-2237-4444, University of Geneva), Fabrice Teroni (0000-0001-6532-4258, University of Bern) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 55-77 |
| Publication date | 2012-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217312000236 |
| OpenAlex | W2147520402 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 16 |
| References cited | 24 |
Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of the relevant evaluative property. We then investigate the roles of motivational bases. Finally, we argue that justified emotions are sufficient for justified evaluative judgements
Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Property (philosophy) · Subject (documents) · Computer Science · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
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Emotional unreliability and epistemic defeat
The Realm of Reason
Emotion
The Emotions
What Emotions Really Are
Émotions et valeurs
The Strike of the Demon
Emotions and Formal Objects
Seeing What to Do
Which Properties are Represented in Perception?
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion
Moral Emotions and Intuitions
Oxford Studies in Metaethics
Reasons and the Good
Slaves of the Passions
Epistemic Justification. Essays in the Theory of Knowledge
Ethics Without Principles
Moral Worth
L’intentionnalité des émotions
| Unique citing works | 16 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,2 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2025 (5) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 12 |