Julien A Deonna
Biographic Data
| ID | 873189 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Julien A Deonna |
| GIVEN NAMES | Julien A |
| FAMILY NAME | Deonna |
| SIGNATURE | DEONNA J A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Geneva, 2 rue de Candolle, 1205 Geneva, Switzerland |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Which Attitudes for the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value
According to the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value concepts, to conceive of an object as having a given value is to conceive of it as being such that a certain evaluative attitude taken towards it would be fitting. Among the challenges that this analysis has to face, two are especially pressing. The first is a psychological challenge: the FA analysis must call upon attitudes that shed light on our value concepts while not presupposing the m…
The Nature of Desire
Desire plays a pivotal role in our lives. Yet in recent times, it has not been a central topic in the philosophy of mind. The aim of this book is to redress this imbalance. What are desires? According to a dogma, desire is a motivational state: desiring is being disposed to act. This conception aligns with the functionalist approach to desire and the standard account of desire’s direction of fit and of its role in explaining action. According to …
The “Guise of the Ought-to-Be
How are we to understand the intentionality of desire? According to the two classical views, desire is either a positive evaluation or a disposition to act. This essay examines these conceptions of desire and argues for a deontic alternative, namely the view that desiring is representing a state of affairs as what ought to be . Three lines of criticism of the classical pictures of desire are provided. The first concerns desire’s direction of fit,…
From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements
Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of th…
Taking affective explanations to heart
In this article, the authors examine and debate the categories of emotions, moods, temperaments, character traits and sentiments. They define them and offer an account of the relations that exist among the phenomena they cover. They argue that, whereas ascribing character traits and sentiments (dispositions) is to ascribe a specific coherence and stability to the emotions (episodes) the subject is likely to feel, ascribing temperaments (dispositi…
Differentiating shame from guilt
From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements
Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of th…
Taking affective explanations to heart
In this article, the authors examine and debate the categories of emotions, moods, temperaments, character traits and sentiments. They define them and offer an account of the relations that exist among the phenomena they cover. They argue that, whereas ascribing character traits and sentiments (dispositions) is to ascribe a specific coherence and stability to the emotions (episodes) the subject is likely to feel, ascribing temperaments (dispositi…
Differentiating shame from guilt
Taking affective explanations to heart
In this article, the authors examine and debate the categories of emotions, moods, temperaments, character traits and sentiments. They define them and offer an account of the relations that exist among the phenomena they cover. They argue that, whereas ascribing character traits and sentiments (dispositions) is to ascribe a specific coherence and stability to the emotions (episodes) the subject is likely to feel, ascribing temperaments (dispositi…
From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements
Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of th…
The Nature of Desire
Desire plays a pivotal role in our lives. Yet in recent times, it has not been a central topic in the philosophy of mind. The aim of this book is to redress this imbalance. What are desires? According to a dogma, desire is a motivational state: desiring is being disposed to act. This conception aligns with the functionalist approach to desire and the standard account of desire’s direction of fit and of its role in explaining action. According to …
The “Guise of the Ought-to-Be
How are we to understand the intentionality of desire? According to the two classical views, desire is either a positive evaluation or a disposition to act. This essay examines these conceptions of desire and argues for a deontic alternative, namely the view that desiring is representing a state of affairs as what ought to be . Three lines of criticism of the classical pictures of desire are provided. The first concerns desire’s direction of fit,…
Which Attitudes for the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value
According to the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value concepts, to conceive of an object as having a given value is to conceive of it as being such that a certain evaluative attitude taken towards it would be fitting. Among the challenges that this analysis has to face, two are especially pressing. The first is a psychological challenge: the FA analysis must call upon attitudes that shed light on our value concepts while not presupposing the m…
Epistemology (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (4 works) · Social Psychology (4 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Sociology (2 works)