Emotional unreliability and epistemic defeat

Bibliographic Data

ID10691312
AuthorsTricia Magalotti (0000-0002-6447-7153, Stockholm University, corresponding author)
Year2024
Publication date2024-09-24
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqae117
OpenAlexW4402854194
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited18

Among those who think that emotions can provide epistemic reasons for belief, there is disagreement about whether emotions provide foundational reasons (ones that are not based on further reasons) or non-foundational reasons (ones that are based on further reasons). I argue in this paper that considerations about evidence of emotional unreliability favour the non-foundational view of emotional reasons. The argument starts with a set of counterexamples to the claim that evidence of emotional unreliability always defeats emotional justification. I then show why only the non-foundational picture of emotional reasons is compatible with this finding. The upshot is 2-fold: first, the commonly held assumption that evidence of emotional unreliability always defeats emotional justification is false; and, second, this gives us a reason for preferring a non-foundational picture of emotional reasons

Argument (complex analysis) · Cognitive psychology · Counterexample · Epistemology · Set (abstract data type) · Computer Science · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

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