Tricia Magalotti
Biographic Data
| ID | 5966675 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Tricia Magalotti |
| GIVEN NAMES | Tricia |
| FAMILY NAME | Magalotti |
| SIGNATURE | MAGALOTTI T |
| AFFILIATIONS | Stockholm University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6447-7153 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Emotional unreliability and epistemic defeat
Among those who think that emotions can provide epistemic reasons for belief, there is disagreement about whether emotions provide foundational reasons (ones that are not based on further reasons) or non-foundational reasons (ones that are based on further reasons). I argue in this paper that considerations about evidence of emotional unreliability favour the non-foundational view of emotional reasons. The argument starts with a set of counterexa…
Value Promotion and the Explanation of Evidential Standards
While it is commonly accepted that justified beliefs must be strongly supported by evidence and that support comes in degrees, the question of how much evidential support one needs in order to have a justified belief remains. In this paper, I consider how the question about degrees of evidential support connects with recent debates between consequentialist and deontological explanations of epistemic norms. I argue that explaining why strong, but …
No prominent works on this page.
Value Promotion and the Explanation of Evidential Standards
While it is commonly accepted that justified beliefs must be strongly supported by evidence and that support comes in degrees, the question of how much evidential support one needs in order to have a justified belief remains. In this paper, I consider how the question about degrees of evidential support connects with recent debates between consequentialist and deontological explanations of epistemic norms. I argue that explaining why strong, but …
Emotional unreliability and epistemic defeat
Among those who think that emotions can provide epistemic reasons for belief, there is disagreement about whether emotions provide foundational reasons (ones that are not based on further reasons) or non-foundational reasons (ones that are based on further reasons). I argue in this paper that considerations about evidence of emotional unreliability favour the non-foundational view of emotional reasons. The argument starts with a set of counterexa…
Computer Science (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Appeal (1 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 works) · Cognitive psychology (1 works) · Consequentialism (1 works) · Counterexample (1 works) · Deontological ethics (1 works)