Jonathan Dancy
Biographic Data
| ID | 489396 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jonathan Dancy |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jonathan |
| FAMILY NAME | Dancy |
| SIGNATURE | DANCY J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Reading |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 65 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 264 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 63 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 2 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1967 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
A Companion to Epistemology
A Companion to Epistemology, 2 Volume Set, 3rd Edition A Companion to Epistemology provides a comprehensive, up-to-date reference for understanding the theory of knowledge. Edited by distinguished scholars, this expanded third edition explores classic questions about knowledge and justified belief alongside contemporary topics such as social and political epistemology, the ethics of belief, and the epistemology of perception. With contributions f…
Steven Pinker, Rationality
Three for the price of two
In this chapter, I recount how two views which it took me years to work up led me without further effort to see the possibility of a third. The first view is called the holism of reasons; this is the view that what is a reason in one case may be no reason in another. The second view is realism in the theory of motivation, that is, the view that the reason for which one acts need not be restricted to psychological facts about oneself, such as that…
Précis of Practical Shape
In Practical Shape, I give an account of practical reasoning whose main purpose is simply to convince people that there is, or at least can be, such a thing. Practical reasoning is reasoning whose
Responses to my critics
Section 1 of Raz’s contribution to this symposium, which has his characteristic combination of subtlety and directness, concerns the relation between: T1: PR is reasoning whose conclusion is an act
Honing Practical Judgement
Journal Article Honing Practical Judgement Get access Jonathan Dancy Jonathan Dancy Correspondence: Jonathan Dancy, Department of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin, 2210 Speedway, Stop C3500, WAG 316, Austin, Texas 78712-1737, USA. Email: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 54, Issue 2, April 2020, Pages 410–424, https://doi.org/10.111…
Practical Shape
This book offers a theory of practical reasoning which is Aristotelian in spirit, since it maintains that one can reason to action in very much the same ways as those in which one can reason to belief. But the book gives its own, non-Aristotelian account of what those ways are; the practical syllogism hardly appears at all. Instead, there are accounts of reasons as considerations favouring a certain response, and of other ways in which considerat…
Philosophy of action
Meta-Ethics in the Twentieth Century
The main stream of academic philosophy, in Anglophone countries and increasingly worldwide, is identified by the name 'analytic'. The study of its history, from the 19th century to the late 20th, has boomed in recent years. These specially commissioned essays by forty leading scholars constitute the most comprehensive book on the subject
A Companion to Epistemology
A companion to epistemology
"Since its first publication, A Companion to Epistemology has established itself as the leading single-volume epistemology reference work in the field. This extended and revised edition brings the Companion up to date." "Part I, consisting of newly commissioned review essays, focuses on the major topics that have an abiding centrality for the field, including a priori justification, Bayesian epistemology, closure, contextualism, epistemic virtue,…
The thing to use
Nonnaturalism
Essentially Comparative Concepts
This paper examines Larry Temkin’s notion of an "essentially comparative" concept and the uses to which he puts it. It is suggested that this notion is a conflation of two distinct notions which need not go together. This leads to a critical examination of Temkin’s arguments that certain central ethical concepts (equality, maximin, utility) are essentially comparative. These arguments are often found wanting, as is Temkin’s treatment of the Perso…
Rationality, Value, and Meaning
Suggests that particularist conceptions of rationality, in general, can be applied to the philosophy of language. Semantic competence does not require that each distinct semantic unit makes the same contribution in all contexts. Distinguishes weak and strong forms of compositionalism, arguing for the former.
Holism and its Consequences
Gives the best argument for holism in the theory of reasons, and then considers how best to establish ethical particularism on that basis. Also considers various ways of accepting holism without going so far as the particularist wants to go.
Principles of Rational Valuing
Considers the prospects of a form of holism in the theory of choice, which holds that the value of one alternative can be affected by the mere presence of others. Argues that this position (also know as the Indifference of Independent Alternatives) is true for independent reasons, though it is also congenial to particularism. The consequence is that there is no possibility of a Full Ordering of values.
Knowing Reasons
A chapter on moral epistemology. Asks what, for the particularist, will count as a basic moral fact. Considers the modal status of such facts, arguing that they are contingent, but known a priori. Claims that this position is neither foundationalist nor coherentist. Ends by considering various suggestions that particularism cannot avoid some form of general scepticism in ethics.
Are there Organic Unities?
Argues against G. E. Moore’s conception of organic unities, attempting to replace it with a conception more amenable to particularism. Considers the possibility of a form of default value acceptable to particularism. Ends by contrasting the views expressed here with those of Kagan.
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value
Considers the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value. Suggests ways in which a particularist can accept a notion of intrinsic value.
Beyond Favouring
Suggests ways of characterising the favouring relation by contrasting it with other forms of relevance, such as enabling and intensifying. Offers examples of the distinction between favouring and enabling in the theory of explanation and in epistemology.
Competing Pictures
Argues against views alternative to particularism in detail, including the views of McNaughton and Rawling, Crisp, Raz, Scanlon, Hooker, Parfit, and also appeals to Aristotelian philosophy of science.
Contributory Reasons
Considers the nature of contributory reasons, contrasting the contributory with the overall. Also considers attempts to characterise the nature of the contributory in terms of overall oughts, arguing that all such attempts fail. Also considers arguments that there can be oughts without reasons, and rejects these too. Concludes that reasons are best understood in terms of the relation of favouring.
Can Holism be True?
Considers various attempts to show that holism in the theory of reasons must be false. Distinguishes various forms of atomism, considers various appeals to notions of complete reasons and full explanations, asks whether moral reasoning is a form of inference and whether conceptual competence requires the existence of natural patterns, and ends by asking whether a particularist can allow that some moral considerations have a default relevance.
Dropping the Catch
Argues that various standard meta-ethical positions have great difficulty in understanding the notion of a contributory reason, being largely formulated to deal with overall oughts. These positions are those of M. Smith, A. Gibbard, F. Jackson, B. Brandom, and I. Kant.
Ethics Without Principles
The book is in three parts. The first part discusses the nature of contributory reasons, set in the more general context of normative theory. It introduces and defends a distinction between reasons and enabling conditions, and considers some other roles that considerations that are morally relevant but not reasons might play. It also asks which meta-ethical positions have the tools necessary to capture the role of contributory reasons. The second…
Practical Reality
Practical Reality is about the relation between the reasons why we do things and the reasons why we should. It claims that, in order to understand this relation, we have to abandon current conceptions of the reasons why we act—our motivating reasons, as they are commonly called—as mental states of ourselves. Belief/desire explanations of action, or even purely cognitive accounts in terms of beliefs alone, drive too great a wedge between the norma…
Arguments From Illusion
Journal Article Arguments From Illusion Get access Jonathan Dancy Jonathan Dancy University of Keek Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 45, Issue 181, October 1995, Pages 421–438, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220307 Published: 01 October 1995
Are There Organic Unities
What Do Reasons Do
Replies
Real Values in a Humean Context
The thing to use
Mill's Puzzling Footnote
This paper discusses various possible interpretations of a complex footnote in Mill's Utilitarianism
Reading Parfit
Knowledge and the State of Nature
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Knowledge and the State of Nature: an Essay in Conceptual Synthesis. By Edward Craig. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Pp. x + 169. Price £22.50.) Jonathan Dancy Jonathan Dancy Keele University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 42, Issue 168, July 1992, Pages 393–395, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219696 Published: 01 July 1992
The Public Schools and the Future
Ifs
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Ifs. Edited by William L. Harper, R. Stalnaker and G. Pearce. (Reidel, 1981. Pp. 345.) Jonathan Dancy Jonathan Dancy University of Keele Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 33, Issue 130, January 1983, Pages 96–98, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219212 Published: 01 January 1983
Supererogation
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Supererogation. By D. Heyd: [Cambridge Studies in Philosophy] ( CUP, 1982. Pp. 191. Price £14.00) Jonathan Dancy Jonathan Dancy University of Keele Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 33, Issue 133, October 1983, Pages 405–406, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219168 Published: 01 October 1983
Even-ifs
An introduction to contemporary epistemology
Metaphysics
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Metaphysics: The Elements. BY Bruce Aune. (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986. Pp. xiv + 235. Price £22.50, pb., £6.95.) Jonathan Dancy Jonathan Dancy University of Keek Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 37, Issue 148, July 1987, Pages 331–334, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220406 Published: 01 July 1987
Berkeley's Doctrine of Notions
Berkeley
Introduction 1. The Background 2. Realism and Representative Realism 3. Abstraction 4. God 5. Real Things 6. Perception and Knowledge 7. Science 8. The Language of God 9. Spirits 10. Conclusions Further Reading
Caring about Justice
In the post-Gilligan debate about the differences, if any, between the ways in which people of different genders see the moral world in which they live, I detect two assumptions. These can be found in Gilligan's early work, and have infected the thought of others. The first, perhaps surprisingly, is Kohlberg's Kantian account of one moral perspective, the one more easily or more naturally operated by men and which has come to be called the justic…
Sense and Certainty
Preface 1 The Problem of Scepticism 2 The Conflict Between Scepticism and Common Sense 3 Moore's Defence of Common Sense 4 On the Significance of What We Would Ordinarily Doubt 5 On the Significance of What We Would Ordinarily Claim to Know 6 Wittgenstein on the Philosopher's Use of `I Know' 7 Wittgenstein on Certainty 8 On the Status of Moore-Type Propositions
Epistemologia Contemporânea (Portuguese Edition)
Knowledge and the State of Nature
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Knowledge and the State of Nature: an Essay in Conceptual Synthesis. By Edward Craig. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Pp. x + 169. Price £22.50.) Jonathan Dancy Jonathan Dancy Keele University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 42, Issue 168, July 1992, Pages 393–395, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219696 Published: 01 July 1992
New Truths in Proust?
Lecture philosophique de la temporalite prosutienne dans A la recherche du temps perdu - a la lumiere d'un rapprochement avec les theories de Hume, Bergson et Schopenhauer conscernant l'experience humaine
Moral Reasons
Book Reviews Get access Moral Reasons. By Jonathan Dancy. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993. Pp. xiii + 263. Price not given.) Mark van Roojen Mark van Roojen Brown University/University of Nebraska, Lincoln Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 45, Issue 178, January 1995, Pages 118–120, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219861 Published: 01 January 1995
Arguments From Illusion
Journal Article Arguments From Illusion Get access Jonathan Dancy Jonathan Dancy University of Keek Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 45, Issue 181, October 1995, Pages 421–438, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220307 Published: 01 October 1995
Real Values in a Humean Context
Wiggins and Ross
Ross's attempt to undermine the consequentialist understanding of the relation between duties and outcomes might give him greater defence against the danger that outcome-related duties will come to constitute a norm, to the disadvantage of all others
Can a Particularist Learn the Difference Between Right and Wrong?
On The Logical And Moral Adequacy Of Particularism
Motivation, Dispositions And Aims
Reading Parfit
The Particularist’s Progress
Many people seem willing to call themselves feminists with little idea of what they are committing themselves to. The same, in my experience, is true of particularism in the theory of moral reasons. There is a common suggestion that to be a particularist is, at the outset, only to admit that circumstances can make a difference. But if that were all that particularism amounted to, it would be uncontentious. In this chapter I lay out what I think o…
Practical reality
Mill's Puzzling Footnote
This paper discusses various possible interpretations of a complex footnote in Mill's Utilitarianism
The Theory of Motivating States
Argues that cognitivism is the best form of psychologism; that is, that Humean accounts of motivation in terms of belief–desire combinations should be rejected in favour of cognitive ones that take motivating states to consist entirely of beliefs. Desire is understood as a state of being motivated, and is therefore not a state that motivates, even though motivation without desire is impossible.
Epistemology (48 works) · Philosophy (44 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (30 works) · Computer Science (23 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (23 works) · Psychology (20 works) · Sociology (17 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (16 works) · Free Will and Agency (15 works) · Philosophy (14 works)