Markus I Eronen
Biographic Data
| ID | 492587 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Markus I Eronen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Markus I |
| FAMILY NAME | Eronen |
| SIGNATURE | ERONEN M I |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Groningen |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2028-3338 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 33 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 15 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Causal complexity and psychological measurement
Psychological measurement has received strong criticism throughout the history of psychological science. Nevertheless, measurements of attributes such as emotions or intelligence continue to be widely used in research and society. I address this puzzle by presenting a new causal perspective to psychological measurement. I start with assumptions that both critics and proponents of psychological measurement are likely to accept: a minimal causal co…
What Are the ‘Levels’ in Levels of Selection
The levels of selection debate is generally taken to be a debate about how natural selection can occur at the various levels of biological organization.In this paper, we argue that questions about levels of selection should be analyzed separately from questions about levels of organization.In the deflationary proposal we defend, all that is necessary for multilevel selection is that there are cases in which particles are nested in collectives, an…
Should psychology follow the methods and principles of the natural sciences? Introduction to the debate
This debate issue centers on the question of whether psychology should follow the methods and principles of the natural sciences. Answers to this question are often implicitly assumed but rarely explicitly debated among psychologists. This issue contains eight invited contributions by scholars whom we anticipated would have strong and divergent positions on the question. The articles present a broad range of perspectives, ranging from phenomenolo…
Causal inference on human behaviour
Quantifying Proportionality and the Limits of Higher-Level Causation and Explanation
Supporters of the autonomy of higher-level causation (or explanation) often appeal to pro- portionality, arguing that higher-level causes are more proportional than their lower-level realizers. Recently, measures based on information theory and causal modelling have been proposed that allow one to shed new light on proportionality and the related notion of specificity. In this article we apply ideas from this literature to the issue of higher ver…
The Theory Crisis in Psychology: How to Move Forward
Meehl argued in 1978 that theories in psychology come and go, with little cumulative progress. We believe that this assessment still holds, as also evidenced by increasingly common claims that psychology is facing a “theory crisis” and that psychologists should invest more in theory building. In this article, we argue that the root cause of the theory crisis is that developing good psychological theories is extremely difficult and that understand…
Philosophy of science and the formalization of psychological theory
One of the original aims of this journal was to promote theory in psychology. Nowadays more and more psychological researchers are calling for more theory development, and articles on the “theory crisis” have also found their way into mainstream journals. In this article, we provide a further perspective to this theory debate. Over the past century, philosophy of science has staged extensive discussions on the mathematization of nature and on the…
Robust realism for the life sciences
Don’t blame the model: Reconsidering the network approach to psychopathology.
The network approach to psychopathology is becoming increasingly popular. The motivation for this approach is to provide a replacement for the problematic common cause perspective and the associated latent variable model, where symptoms are taken to be mere effects of a common cause (the disorder itself). The idea is that the latent variable model is plausible for medical diseases, but unrealistic for mental disorders, which should rather be conc…
The significance of levels of organization for scientific research: A heuristic approach 1
Heating up the measurement debate: What psychologists can learn from the history of physics
Discussions of psychological measurement are largely disconnected from issues of measurement in the natural sciences. We show that there are interesting parallels and connections between the two, by focusing on a real and detailed example (temperature) from the history of science. More specifically, our novel approach is to study the issue of validity based on the history of measurement in physics, which will lead to three concrete points that ar…
Robustness and reality
Understanding through modeling: The explanatory power of inadequate representation
No Levels, No Problems: Downward Causation in Neuroscience
I show that the recent account of levels in neuroscience proposed by Craver and Bechtel is unsatisfactory since it fails to provide a plausible criterion for being at the same level and is incompatible with Craver and Bechtel’s account of downward causation. Furthermore, I argue that no distinct notion of levels is needed for analyzing explanations and causal issues in neuroscience: it is better to rely on more well-defined notions such as compos…
Reduction in Philosophy of Mind: A Pluralistic Account
The notion of reduction continues to play a key role in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science. Supporters of reductionism claim that psychological properties or explanations reduce to neural properties or explanations, while antireductionists claim that such reductions are not possible. In this book, I apply recent developments in philosophy of science, particularly the mechanistic explanation paradigm and the interventionist the…
Robustness and reality
No Levels, No Problems: Downward Causation in Neuroscience
I show that the recent account of levels in neuroscience proposed by Craver and Bechtel is unsatisfactory since it fails to provide a plausible criterion for being at the same level and is incompatible with Craver and Bechtel’s account of downward causation. Furthermore, I argue that no distinct notion of levels is needed for analyzing explanations and causal issues in neuroscience: it is better to rely on more well-defined notions such as compos…
Causal inference on human behaviour
The significance of levels of organization for scientific research: A heuristic approach 1
Quantifying Proportionality and the Limits of Higher-Level Causation and Explanation
Supporters of the autonomy of higher-level causation (or explanation) often appeal to pro- portionality, arguing that higher-level causes are more proportional than their lower-level realizers. Recently, measures based on information theory and causal modelling have been proposed that allow one to shed new light on proportionality and the related notion of specificity. In this article we apply ideas from this literature to the issue of higher ver…
Robust realism for the life sciences
Understanding through modeling: The explanatory power of inadequate representation
Reduction in Philosophy of Mind: A Pluralistic Account
The notion of reduction continues to play a key role in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science. Supporters of reductionism claim that psychological properties or explanations reduce to neural properties or explanations, while antireductionists claim that such reductions are not possible. In this book, I apply recent developments in philosophy of science, particularly the mechanistic explanation paradigm and the interventionist the…
No Levels, No Problems: Downward Causation in Neuroscience
I show that the recent account of levels in neuroscience proposed by Craver and Bechtel is unsatisfactory since it fails to provide a plausible criterion for being at the same level and is incompatible with Craver and Bechtel’s account of downward causation. Furthermore, I argue that no distinct notion of levels is needed for analyzing explanations and causal issues in neuroscience: it is better to rely on more well-defined notions such as compos…
Robustness and reality
Understanding through modeling: The explanatory power of inadequate representation
Heating up the measurement debate: What psychologists can learn from the history of physics
Discussions of psychological measurement are largely disconnected from issues of measurement in the natural sciences. We show that there are interesting parallels and connections between the two, by focusing on a real and detailed example (temperature) from the history of science. More specifically, our novel approach is to study the issue of validity based on the history of measurement in physics, which will lead to three concrete points that ar…
Don’t blame the model: Reconsidering the network approach to psychopathology.
The network approach to psychopathology is becoming increasingly popular. The motivation for this approach is to provide a replacement for the problematic common cause perspective and the associated latent variable model, where symptoms are taken to be mere effects of a common cause (the disorder itself). The idea is that the latent variable model is plausible for medical diseases, but unrealistic for mental disorders, which should rather be conc…
The significance of levels of organization for scientific research: A heuristic approach 1
Robust realism for the life sciences
Philosophy of science and the formalization of psychological theory
One of the original aims of this journal was to promote theory in psychology. Nowadays more and more psychological researchers are calling for more theory development, and articles on the “theory crisis” have also found their way into mainstream journals. In this article, we provide a further perspective to this theory debate. Over the past century, philosophy of science has staged extensive discussions on the mathematization of nature and on the…
The Theory Crisis in Psychology: How to Move Forward
Meehl argued in 1978 that theories in psychology come and go, with little cumulative progress. We believe that this assessment still holds, as also evidenced by increasingly common claims that psychology is facing a “theory crisis” and that psychologists should invest more in theory building. In this article, we argue that the root cause of the theory crisis is that developing good psychological theories is extremely difficult and that understand…
Quantifying Proportionality and the Limits of Higher-Level Causation and Explanation
Supporters of the autonomy of higher-level causation (or explanation) often appeal to pro- portionality, arguing that higher-level causes are more proportional than their lower-level realizers. Recently, measures based on information theory and causal modelling have been proposed that allow one to shed new light on proportionality and the related notion of specificity. In this article we apply ideas from this literature to the issue of higher ver…
Should psychology follow the methods and principles of the natural sciences? Introduction to the debate
This debate issue centers on the question of whether psychology should follow the methods and principles of the natural sciences. Answers to this question are often implicitly assumed but rarely explicitly debated among psychologists. This issue contains eight invited contributions by scholars whom we anticipated would have strong and divergent positions on the question. The articles present a broad range of perspectives, ranging from phenomenolo…
Causal inference on human behaviour
Causal complexity and psychological measurement
Psychological measurement has received strong criticism throughout the history of psychological science. Nevertheless, measurements of attributes such as emotions or intelligence continue to be widely used in research and society. I address this puzzle by presenting a new causal perspective to psychological measurement. I start with assumptions that both critics and proponents of psychological measurement are likely to accept: a minimal causal co…
What Are the ‘Levels’ in Levels of Selection
The levels of selection debate is generally taken to be a debate about how natural selection can occur at the various levels of biological organization.In this paper, we argue that questions about levels of selection should be analyzed separately from questions about levels of organization.In the deflationary proposal we defend, all that is necessary for multilevel selection is that there are cases in which particles are nested in collectives, an…
Epistemology (14 works) · Philosophy (13 works) · Computer Science (11 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (9 works) · Psychology (9 works) · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology (5 works) · Philosophy of science (5 works) · Artificial Intelligence (4 works) · Cognitive psychology (4 works) · Cognitive science (4 works)