Andrés G Garcia
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 5126170 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Andrés G Garcia |
| NOMBRES | Andrés G |
| APELLIDO | Garcia |
| FIRMA | GARCÍA A G |
| AFILIACIONES | Lund University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7472-5456 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 10 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 0 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 10 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2018 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 0 |
Circular Definitions of ‘Good’ and the Good of Circular Definitions
I defend the view that circular definitions can be useful and illuminating by focusing on the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This definition states that an item has value if and only if it is a fitting target of attitudes. Good items are the fitting targets of positive attitudes, and bad items are the fitting targets of negative ones. I shall argue that a circular version of this definition, defended by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006…
The Ethics of Viewing Illegally Shared Pornography
I argue that the consumption of illegally shared pornography is often morally problematic. My argument is not based on any general condemnation of pornography or even illegal content sharing as such. Instead, my argument emphasizes that commercial pornography that is illegally shared risks violating the consent and thus the dignity of its performers. In this way, illegally shared pornography is akin to ‘revenge porn’, involving the non‐consensual…
On neutral value and fitting indifference
A standard approach to neutral value suggests that it can be understood in comparative terms by reference to value relations. I develop some objections to the standard approach based on assumptions about value facts being closely connected to fittingness facts. I then suggest that these objections give us reasons to amend the standard approach with a noncomparative understanding. The claim is that if an item has neutral value, then it is a fittin…
Value relations sans evaluative grounds
I argue that there can be value relations without individual values to support them. The fact that an item is better than another item does not have to be explained by reference to the values of the individual items. Instead, value relations can be grounded directly and exhaustively in descriptive facts about their relata . I show that my suggestion fits well with plausible perspectives on the nature of values and reasons, respectively. One of th…
Reconciling the Deprivation Account with the Final Badness of Death
The explanatory objection to the fitting attitude analysis of value
The Unfairness Objection to the Practice of Collective Moral Responsibility
The assumption here is that a praiseworthy or blameworthy agent must have causally produced an outcome of value for which they can become the fitting targets of attitudes, most notably the attitudes of praise or blame. The question whether there are additional requirements that determine the extent to which an agent is praiseworthy or blameworthy is a difficult one. It seems plausible to suggest, as Peter Strawson does, that factors pertaining to…
Toward a Reasons-First View of Normative Background Conditions
Background conditions are thought to explain how objects can have value in virtue of certain features and how reasons can consist in certain facts. The following paper provides an account of what background conditions are and what effect they have on normative features. It defends the idea that if values depend on reasons, then there is nothing really surprising or mysterious about the presence of background conditions in normative explanations. …
Subjectivism and the Framework of Constitutive Grounds
Philosophers have applied the framework of constitutive grounds to make sense of the disagreement between subjectivism and objectivism. The framework understands the two theories as being involved in a disagreement about the extent to which value is determined by attitudes. Although the framework affords us with some useful observations about how this should be interpreted, the question how value can be determined by attitudes in the first place …
The Finality and Instrumentality of Value in a Way
Final value accrues to objects that are good for their own sakes, while instrumental value accrues to objects that are good for the sake of their effects. The following paper aims to show that this distinction cuts across some surprising areas of the evaluative domain. This means that there may be some unexpected types of value that can come in a final or instrumental form. The argument proceeds by looking at two prominent types of value, namely …
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Subjectivism and the Framework of Constitutive Grounds
Philosophers have applied the framework of constitutive grounds to make sense of the disagreement between subjectivism and objectivism. The framework understands the two theories as being involved in a disagreement about the extent to which value is determined by attitudes. Although the framework affords us with some useful observations about how this should be interpreted, the question how value can be determined by attitudes in the first place …
The Finality and Instrumentality of Value in a Way
Final value accrues to objects that are good for their own sakes, while instrumental value accrues to objects that are good for the sake of their effects. The following paper aims to show that this distinction cuts across some surprising areas of the evaluative domain. This means that there may be some unexpected types of value that can come in a final or instrumental form. The argument proceeds by looking at two prominent types of value, namely …
Toward a Reasons-First View of Normative Background Conditions
Background conditions are thought to explain how objects can have value in virtue of certain features and how reasons can consist in certain facts. The following paper provides an account of what background conditions are and what effect they have on normative features. It defends the idea that if values depend on reasons, then there is nothing really surprising or mysterious about the presence of background conditions in normative explanations. …
The explanatory objection to the fitting attitude analysis of value
The Unfairness Objection to the Practice of Collective Moral Responsibility
The assumption here is that a praiseworthy or blameworthy agent must have causally produced an outcome of value for which they can become the fitting targets of attitudes, most notably the attitudes of praise or blame. The question whether there are additional requirements that determine the extent to which an agent is praiseworthy or blameworthy is a difficult one. It seems plausible to suggest, as Peter Strawson does, that factors pertaining to…
Reconciling the Deprivation Account with the Final Badness of Death
Value relations sans evaluative grounds
I argue that there can be value relations without individual values to support them. The fact that an item is better than another item does not have to be explained by reference to the values of the individual items. Instead, value relations can be grounded directly and exhaustively in descriptive facts about their relata . I show that my suggestion fits well with plausible perspectives on the nature of values and reasons, respectively. One of th…
The Ethics of Viewing Illegally Shared Pornography
I argue that the consumption of illegally shared pornography is often morally problematic. My argument is not based on any general condemnation of pornography or even illegal content sharing as such. Instead, my argument emphasizes that commercial pornography that is illegally shared risks violating the consent and thus the dignity of its performers. In this way, illegally shared pornography is akin to ‘revenge porn’, involving the non‐consensual…
On neutral value and fitting indifference
A standard approach to neutral value suggests that it can be understood in comparative terms by reference to value relations. I develop some objections to the standard approach based on assumptions about value facts being closely connected to fittingness facts. I then suggest that these objections give us reasons to amend the standard approach with a noncomparative understanding. The claim is that if an item has neutral value, then it is a fittin…
Circular Definitions of ‘Good’ and the Good of Circular Definitions
I defend the view that circular definitions can be useful and illuminating by focusing on the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This definition states that an item has value if and only if it is a fitting target of attitudes. Good items are the fitting targets of positive attitudes, and bad items are the fitting targets of negative ones. I shall argue that a circular version of this definition, defended by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006…
Epistemology (7 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (7 obras) · Philosophy (6 obras) · Philosophy (5 obras) · Psychology (5 obras) · Sociology (5 obras) · Free Will and Agency (4 obras) · Political science (4 obras) · Computer Science (3 obras) · Law (3 obras)