Gösta Grönroos
Biographic Data
| ID | 5148779 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Gösta Grönroos |
| GIVEN NAMES | Gösta |
| FAMILY NAME | Grönroos |
| SIGNATURE | GRÖNROOS G |
| AFFILIATIONS | Stockholm University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8426-8156 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Notes on Nicomachean Ethics 1173 a 2–5
In Nicomachean Ethics (= Eth. Nic. ) 10.2, Aristotle addresses Eudoxus' argument that pleasure is the chief good in his characteristically dialectical manner. The argument is that pleasure is the chief good, since all creatures, rational (ἔλλογα) and non-rational (ἄλογα) alike, are perceived to aim at pleasure (1172 b 9–11). At 1172 b 35–1173 a 5, Aristotle turns to an objection against Eudoxus' argument. For some object (οἱ δ’ἐνιστάμενοι) to the…
Wish, Motivation and the Human Good in Aristotle
Aristotle invokes a specifically human desire, namely wish ( boulēsis ), to provide a teleological explanation of the pursuit of the specifically human good in terms of virtuous activity. Wish is a basic, unreasoned desire which, independently of other desires, or evaluative attitudes, motivates the pursuit of the human good. Even a person who pursues what she mistakenly believes to be good is motivated by wish for what in fact is good, although …
Listening To Reason In Aristotle’s Moral Psychology
Aristotle’S excellent, or virtuous, person must meet two requirements: he or she must strive for what is good, and be able to figure out how to achieve it. This means that the virtuous person must be motivated by sound desires, and have a well-developed power of reasoning. Virtue, therefore, is manifested both in the state of the desires and in the reasoning powers. Aristotle puts these two requirements on the excellent person in terms of two kin…
Wish, Motivation and the Human Good in Aristotle
Aristotle invokes a specifically human desire, namely wish ( boulēsis ), to provide a teleological explanation of the pursuit of the specifically human good in terms of virtuous activity. Wish is a basic, unreasoned desire which, independently of other desires, or evaluative attitudes, motivates the pursuit of the human good. Even a person who pursues what she mistakenly believes to be good is motivated by wish for what in fact is good, although …
Listening To Reason In Aristotle’s Moral Psychology
Aristotle’S excellent, or virtuous, person must meet two requirements: he or she must strive for what is good, and be able to figure out how to achieve it. This means that the virtuous person must be motivated by sound desires, and have a well-developed power of reasoning. Virtue, therefore, is manifested both in the state of the desires and in the reasoning powers. Aristotle puts these two requirements on the excellent person in terms of two kin…
Wish, Motivation and the Human Good in Aristotle
Aristotle invokes a specifically human desire, namely wish ( boulēsis ), to provide a teleological explanation of the pursuit of the specifically human good in terms of virtuous activity. Wish is a basic, unreasoned desire which, independently of other desires, or evaluative attitudes, motivates the pursuit of the human good. Even a person who pursues what she mistakenly believes to be good is motivated by wish for what in fact is good, although …
Notes on Nicomachean Ethics 1173 a 2–5
In Nicomachean Ethics (= Eth. Nic. ) 10.2, Aristotle addresses Eudoxus' argument that pleasure is the chief good in his characteristically dialectical manner. The argument is that pleasure is the chief good, since all creatures, rational (ἔλλογα) and non-rational (ἄλογα) alike, are perceived to aim at pleasure (1172 b 9–11). At 1172 b 35–1173 a 5, Aristotle turns to an objection against Eudoxus' argument. For some object (οἱ δ’ἐνιστάμενοι) to the…
Classical Philosophy and Thought (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Form of the Good (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Active listening (1 work) · Ancient philosophy (1 work) · Argument (complex analysis (1 work)