Benjamin Kozuch
Biographic Data
| ID | 5236833 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Benjamin Kozuch |
| GIVEN NAMES | Benjamin |
| FAMILY NAME | Kozuch |
| SIGNATURE | KOZUCH B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Alabama |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1550-213X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Illusory Illusions
Neuroscience undermines the higher-order theorists’ preferred solution to the targetless HOT problem
The Higher-Order Theory (HOT) of consciousness holds that mental states become conscious when they are represented by another mental state. Most HOT theorists maintain that it is the higher-order, rather than the lower-order, state that supplies the content of conscious experience. This view entails that, for a state to become conscious, its content must be represented in the brain regions that produce higher-order states, which are widely though…
A Legion of Lesions
Better bridges
Conscious vision guides motor action—rarely
According to Milner and Goodale’s dual visual systems (DVS) theory, a division obtains between visual consciousness and motor action, in that the visual system producing conscious vision (the ventral stream) is distinct from the one guiding action (the dorsal stream). That there would be this division is often taken (by Andy Clark and others) to undermine the folk view on how consciousness and action relate. However, even if this division obtains…
A new low
Underwhelming force
Proponents of the higher‐order (HO) theory of consciousness (e.g., Lau and Rosenthal) have recently appealed to brain lesion evidence to support their thesis that mental states are conscious when and only when represented by other mental states. This article argues that this evidence fails to support HO theory, doing this by first determining what kinds of conscious deficit should result when HO state‐producing areas are damaged, then arguing tha…
Elizabeth Irvine Consciousness as a Scientific Concept
No prominent works on this page.
Elizabeth Irvine Consciousness as a Scientific Concept
Underwhelming force
Proponents of the higher‐order (HO) theory of consciousness (e.g., Lau and Rosenthal) have recently appealed to brain lesion evidence to support their thesis that mental states are conscious when and only when represented by other mental states. This article argues that this evidence fails to support HO theory, doing this by first determining what kinds of conscious deficit should result when HO state‐producing areas are damaged, then arguing tha…
Conscious vision guides motor action—rarely
According to Milner and Goodale’s dual visual systems (DVS) theory, a division obtains between visual consciousness and motor action, in that the visual system producing conscious vision (the ventral stream) is distinct from the one guiding action (the dorsal stream). That there would be this division is often taken (by Andy Clark and others) to undermine the folk view on how consciousness and action relate. However, even if this division obtains…
A new low
A Legion of Lesions
Better bridges
Illusory Illusions
Neuroscience undermines the higher-order theorists’ preferred solution to the targetless HOT problem
The Higher-Order Theory (HOT) of consciousness holds that mental states become conscious when they are represented by another mental state. Most HOT theorists maintain that it is the higher-order, rather than the lower-order, state that supplies the content of conscious experience. This view entails that, for a state to become conscious, its content must be represented in the brain regions that produce higher-order states, which are widely though…
Philosophy (7 works) · Consciousness (6 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Cognitive psychology (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Cognitive science (4 works) · Functional Brain Connectivity Studies (4 works) · Neural dynamics and brain function (3 works) · Neuroscience (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works)